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COPS TOP COURTS IN 
CONFIDENCE OF THE PEOPLE
According to an Angus Reid poll released in 
January 2020, more Canadians have confidence in 
their local police than the courts. When asked, a 
majority (57%) of Canadians had confidence in 
their local municipal police  or local RCMP 
detachment compared to those having confidence 
in their provincial criminal courts (36%) or even 
the Supreme Court of Canada (40%).
More people in BC had confidence in their local 
police (63%) than any other region, followed by 
Saskatchewan (61%). More Quebecers (54%) had 
confidence in the Supreme Court of Canada and 
their provincial criminal courts (44%). As for their 
provincial police forces, those from Ontario had 
more confidence (59%) than their neighbours in 
Quebec (54%). Overall, 54% of Canadians 
expressed confidence in the RCMP.
For the complete poll click here.
“IN SERVICE: 10-8” 
TURNS TWENTY
The “In Service: 10-8” newsletter now spans two 
decades. Starting in 2001 and billing itself as a “peer 
read publication”, it now enters its 20th year in 
2020. Initially started as an “off-the-corner-of-the-
desk” information source and distributed to Police 
Academy recruits and independent municipal police 
departments in British Columbia, it is now read by 
police officers and others from coast to coast to 
coast and beyond. The newsletter’s readers span all 
10 provinces and three territories. Hundreds of law 
enforcement officers subscribe to its email 
distribution list.  
If you’re a regular reader, you no doubt have seen 
the cases where the lack of knowledge by some 
officers has been heavily criticized by the courts and 
led to the exclusion of crucial evidence. There is no 
doubt that understanding all legal nuances is 
impossible. Just look at the Supreme Court of 
Canada itself. So often the justices of Canada’s 
highest court can’t agree on a particular issue. This is 
even after they have had months to reflect on 
evidence, evaluate legal arguments, and draft an 
opinion in the calmness of their chambers. Police, 
on the other hand, often in an environment of chaos 
and calamity, may only have a moment to make 
observations, orient themselves, make a decision 
and then act. (Some of you may recognize this as the 
OODA loop.) The point being, your decisions 
matter. And why you did what you did does too. 
Why not do all that you can to keep yourself up-to-
date on the important cases that define and refine 
police powers and duties? The answer to me seems 
simple. We owe it to our profession! And the people 
we serve! The hope of this newsletter is to make this 
task a little bit easier!



























We are interested in your feedback about the newsletter. Submit a comment here.
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Law Enforcement Studies Diploma
Be the one making a difference  and keeping 
communities safe. If you want to gain the applied 
skills to be a sought-after graduate pursuing a 
rewarding career in law enforcement and public 
safety, then this program is for you.
Now accepting applications for September 2020.
Application deadline is March 13, 2020.
Bachelor of Law Enforcement Studies
Be the one making a difference  and keeping 
communities safe. If you have a relevant diploma or 
associate  degree and are interested in obtaining an 
applied degree to pursue a law enforcement or 
public safety career, then this program is for you.
Now accepting applications for September 2020.
Application deadline is April 30, 2020.
Tactical Criminal Analysis
The graduate certificate in Tactical Criminal Analysis 
is a 15 credit program (five 3-credit courses 
delivered online) which will provide an advanced 
level theoretical and applied framework for the 
study of criminal intelligence and analysis, and its 
application in a  wide variety of law enforcement 
contexts.
Now accepting applications for September 2020.
Application deadline is on May 8, 2020
Note-able Quote
“If you gotta do it anyway, 
why not be great at it?”
~Inky Johnson~
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN THE 
LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
Being the boss: the 3 imperatives for becoming a 
great leader.
Linda A. Hill & Kent Lineback.
Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, 2019.
HF 5549.12 H554 2019
Commissions of inquiry.
Hon. Stephen Goudge & Heather MacIvor.
Toronto, ON: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2019.
KE 4765 C663 2019
Cooling the flames: communication, control, and 
de-escalation of mentally ill and aggressive 
patients: a comprehensive guidebook for 
firefighters and emergency medical services.
Ellis Amdur & John K. Murphy.
Shoreline, WA: Edgework Books, 2015.
RC 480.6 A43 2015
Critical perspectives on the management and 
organization of emergency services.
Paresh Wankhade, Leo McCann, & Pete Murphy, 
editors.
New York, NY: Routledge, 2019.
HV 551.3 C756 2019
The happiness project : or, why I spent a year 
trying to sing in the morning, clean my closets, 
fight right, read Aristotle, and generally have 
more fun.
Gretchen Rubin.
New York, NY: Harpercollins, 2018.
BF 575 H27 R83 2018
How to have impossible conversations: a very 
practical guide.
Peter Boghossian & James Lindsay.
New York, NY: Life Long, 2019.
BF 637 C45 B64 2019
Justice, crime, and ethics.
Michael C. Braswell, Belinda R. McCarthy & Bernard 
J. McCarthy, editors.
New York, NY: Routledge, 2020.
HV 7419 J87 2020
Looking at law: Canada's legal system.
Barry Wright, Vincent Kazmierski, Betina Appel 
Kuzmarov & Rebecca Jaremko Bromwich.
Toronto, ON: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2019.
KE 444 F588 2019
Managing domestic violence: a practical 
handbook for family lawyers.
Desmond Ellis.
Toronto, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2019.
KE 569 E44 2019
Questions are the answer: a breakthrough 
approach to your most vexing problems at work 
and in life.
Hal Gregersen.
New York, NY: HarperBusiness, an imprint of 
HarperCollins Publishers,
HD 53 G745 2018
Surrounded by idiots: the four types of human 
behavior and how to effectively communicate 
with each in business (and in life).
Thomas Erikson.
New York, NY: St. Martin's Essentials, 2019.
HM 1166 E742 2019
Violence assessment and intervention: the 
practitioner's handbook.
James S. Cawood & Michael H. Corcoran.
Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, an 
imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, 2020.
HM 1116 C39 2020
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BCFirstRespondersMentalHealth.com
IT’S TIME TO SPEAK UP ABOUT MENTAL HEALTH.
















































For more resources on better understanding mental health in the context of the 
experiences and pressures of first responders, as well as the broader population, 
visit the following link.
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SUFFICIENT INFORMATION 
REMAINED IN EXCISED ITO: 
WARRANT VALID
R. v. Tran, 2019 ONCA 1011
The police obtained Controlled Drugs 
and Substances Act warrants to search 
two marihuana growing houses in 
unoccupied residential premises as 
well as the accused’s home. The ITO 
was common to all three search warrants. The ITO 
was based on a combination of information from a 
confidential informer, a city computer, various 
police data  bases, the electricity provider, police 
surveillance and inferences drawn from an 
experienced drug investigator (the affiant). This 
included: 
• Information provided over several months by a 
confidential informer about an alleged grow house 
at a specified address apparently monitored by a 
man fitting the general description of the accused 
and driving a motor vehicle of the same make and 
model as that registered to the accused’s wife;
• The consumption of electricity from the electrical 
services provider at the premises where the two 
marijuana grow operations were located. This 
information included consumption data specific to 
each location and a comparison with consumption 
for similar-sized residences in the same 
neighbourhood. It was relied upon to support an 
inference that a by-pass was installed at each 
location to mask the electrical consumption 
necessary for a marijuana grow operation. The 
police obtained this information without a warrant 
or production order;
• The accused’s dated prior convictions of two 
Criminal Code motor vehicle offences;
• Ten contacts of the accused with the investigating 
police service over a period of nine years, the most 
recent of which occurred six years before the 
offences being investigated and the oldest 15 years 
prior;
• Information about two incidents involving 
marijuana grow operations more than a decade 
earlier. In one, the accused was not charged and in 
the other he was acquitted of producing marijuana 
and possessing marijuana for the purposes of 
trafficking;
• Police surveillance of the premises shortly before 
the warrant was obtained and executed at two 
premises on the same street. Property records 
confirmed the accused owned these premises. Both 
apparently were unoccupied but had covered 
windows. Their roof vents were spinning even 
though vents on adjacent houses remained static. 
And an odour of vegetative marijuana was detected 
emanating from one of the premises;
• Police confirmed the accused’s brief attendance at 
both properties through surveillance on the day 
before the warrant was obtained and executed. He 
was driving a vehicle registered to his wife identical 
in make and model to that described by the 
confidential informer; 
• An experienced drug investigator gave an opinion 
describing the inferences she drew from the 
confidential informer’s information and the 
confirmation of it by police surveillance, property 
records and vehicle registration. 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused challenged the validity of the 
search warrants and sought the exclusion 
of the evidence. The judge granted leave 
for the accused to cross-examine the 
affiant of the warrants. The accused wanted the 
information obtained by unconstitutional seizures 
and other information that was erroneous, false, 
misleading or strategically omitted stripped from 
What Police Found
Residence 1:
• A marihuana grow operation (333 plants)
• An electrical bypass
Residence 2:
• A marihuana grow operation (541 plants)
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the ITO. The judge did excise  the electrical records 
— obtained without prior authorization — and 
information related to the accused’s history with 
police. The remaining information following 
excision, in the accused’s view, was insufficient for 
the warrants to be issued and the evidence ought to 
be excluded. The accused also argued that, even if 
the warrant was valid, the judge should exercise his 
discretion and nevertheless set it aside because the 
affiant’s conduct was subversive of the  pre-
authorization process.
The judge rejected the accused’s assertions. First, 
even after excising the information obtained 
through unconstitutional police conduct — the 
electrical consumption records for the two grow 
houses — and other information the judge 
considered improper such as the accused’s 
unrelated criminal record and contact with the 
police, and false or misleading information about 
two incidents occurring several years earlier, the 
warrants were  not set aside. In the judge's opinion, 
there was enough sufficient reliable evidence 
remaining to issue the warrants despite the excision 
of this information. 
Second, the judge refused to set aside the warrants 
on the  basis that the affiant’s conduct in connection 
with the ITO was so subversive of the pre-
authorization process that the warrants should 
nonetheless be set aside even though they were 
grounded on an adequate evidentiary foundation. 
The accused was convicted on two counts of each 
for producing and possessing marihuana for the 
purpose of trafficking  and theft of electricity. He 
was sentenced to 15 months imprisonment 
followed by one year of probation.
Ontario Court of Appeal 
The accused again argued the 
warrants ought to have been 
quashed and the evidence 
excluded. He submitted the 
remaining information after excision was 
insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrants or, 
in the  alternative, the judge ought to have exercised 
his residual discretion to set aside the warrant on 
the basis that the process was subverted.
Warrant Excision
The task of a trial judge when reviewing a search 
warrant it to excise information from the ITO that 
was obtained by constitutional infringement or was 
misleading or erroneous. Then, the judge is to 
determine whether what remained in the  ITO, as 
amplified on review, affords sufficient reliable 
evidence on which the warrant could have issued.
In this case, the trial judge was satisfied that the 
remaining information in the  ITO after excision, 
considered as a whole, was reliable enough 
evidence to issue the warrants. The Court of Appeal 
concluded the trial judge did not err nor materially 
misapprehend the evidence. The trial judge’s 
conclusion was not plainly unreasonable nor did 
his reasons demonstrate  any palpable and 
overriding error of fact. 
Residual Discretion to Quash Warrant
The Court of Appeal also rejected the accused’s 
suggestion that the trial judge erred in refusing to 
exercise his residual discretion to set aside the 
warrants on the basis that the affiant’s conduct in 
the pre-authorization process amounted to a 
subversion of that process. But the Appeal Court 
offered this caution:
[W]e consider it appropriate to add that the 
affiant’s conduct in this case should not be 
repeated. The obligation of full, fair and frank 
disclosure is not a licence to include irrelevant 
information; invite propensity reasoning; 
contest factual determinations explicit or 
implicit in decisions of courts of competent 
jurisdiction; or offer opinions unsupported by 
essential factual underpinnings. [para. 18]
The accused’s conviction appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s Note: Additional details obtained from R. 
v. Tran, 2018 ONSC 132.
Note-able Quote
“Life is lived in the front row.”
~Marilyn Sherman~
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ENTRY INTO PARKING GARAGE 
DID NOT BREACH PRIVACY BUT 
HALLWAY ENTRY DID
R. v. Yu et al., 2019 ONCA 942
While investigating criminal gang 
activity and high level drug trafficking, 
p o l i c e o b t a i n e d w i r e t a p 
authorizations under the Criminal 
Code  allowing them to intercept the 
communications of certain targets. Before the 
warrants were issued, the  police had already 
accessed common areas of condominium buildings 
to make observations, including entering the 
parking garages, hallways and stairwells. These 
entries had generally  been done with the consent of 
the condominium building management. The 
police had also installed hidden hallway cameras in 
some of the condominium buildings, again with the 
consent of condominium management. 
A general warrant also obtained under the Criminal 
Code  authorized the police to use  a Mobile Device 
Identifier (“MDI”) to identify the cellphones of the 
targets of the investigation. The general warrant also 
permitted the police to enter common areas of 
multi-unit buildings, enter the private units of some 
of the accused and their associates, and install 
hidden cameras in the hallways outside the 
condominium units of some of the investigation's 
targets. Police seized firearms, ammunition, bullet 
proof vests, GPS tracking devices, heroin, cocaine 
and almost $350,000 cash. The investigation led to 
the arrest of some 112 individuals on a variety  of 
charges including murder, drug and firearms and 
human trafficking, possessing firearms, and 
possessing drugs for the purpose of trafficking. 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Several of the targets — including each of 
the four accused — sought to exclude 
evidence obtained through the wiretaps 
and general warrants on the basis that 
their authorization and execution breached s. 8 of 
the Charter. As part of the  challenge  to the 
authorizations, the accused argued that the 
warrantless entries made by the police  into the 
common areas of certain condominium buildings 
and the installation of police cameras in common 
areas without a warrant, but with the consent of the 
condominium management, breached s. 8 of the 
Charter. 
The judge found, in part, the vast majority of the 
physical police  surveillance occurred in relation to 
parking garages rather than hallways or common 
areas. He also concluded that the purpose of the 
garage entries was to determine whether the 
suspect’s car was parked in the garage. This would 
assist police in deciding whether to set up 
surveillance outside the building. As for the entries 
into the elevators and hallways, these were done to 
confirm whether the suspect was a  resident of the 
building, determine the unit number a suspect 
entered and determine which way the unit faced. 
A judge dismissed the accused’s application. He 
found the warrantless entries into the  common 
areas did not violate s. 8 of the Charter. First, the 
accused did not have a reasonable  expectation of 
privacy in the common areas of the  condominiums 
and therefore the entries into those areas and 
limited physical surveillance did not amount to a 
“search” for Charter purposes. Second, the judge 
ruled there was no s. 8 violation by the warrantless 
installation of the hidden hallway cameras. The 
police had obtained val id consent f rom 
condominium management to install the  cameras 
and a warrant was not required given the 
diminished expectation of privacy in common areas 
such as hallways. The accused were convicted and 
sentenced to prison. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued, among 
o t h e r t h i n g s , t h a t t h e 
application judge erred in 
failing to exclude evidence 
obtained through the wiretaps and general warrant. 
They suggested that the warrantless entries into 
condominium common areas and the warrantless 
installation of hidden cameras in their hallways 
breached s. 8 and the evidence ought to have been 
excluded under s. 24(2). 
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s. 8 of the Charter
Justice Tulloch, authoring the Court of Appeal’s 
decision, first reviewed s. 8 of the Charter. He 
stated:
For s. 8 of the Charter to be engaged, the 
accused person must possess a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. Once it is determined 
that the accused has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy, a warrantless search that intrudes on 
that expectation will be presumptively 
unreasonable. The onus is on the Crown to 
show that the search was authorized by law. 
The authorizing law must be reasonable, and 
the search must have been conducted in a 
reasonable manner. [references omitted, para. 
63]
Common Areas of Multi-Unit Dwelling
Determining whether an individual has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the common 
areas of a multi-unit dwelling depends on the 
totality  of the circumstances. Various factors to 
consider in this contextual analysis include:
1. The subject matter of the alleged search;
2. The claimant’s interest in the subject matter;
3. Whether the claimant had a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the subject matter; 
and
4. Whether the subjective expectation of privacy 
was objectively reasonable.
Moreover, the following factors are relevant to the 
level of expectation of privacy in common areas of 
multi-unit buildings:
• The degree  of possession or control exercised 
over the common area by the claimant;
• The size  of the building: the larger the 
building, the lower the degree  of reasonable 
expectation of privacy in common areas;
• Whether a security system or locked doors 
function to exclude the public and regulate 
access; and
• The ownership of the property.
In reviewing these factors Justice Tulloch stated:
In my view, these factors lead to different 
conclusions depending on the type of common 
area accessed by the police, which in this case 
relates to the parking garage and the hallways. I 
conclude that the [accused] did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
parking garages, but they did have such an 
expectation of privacy in their hallways, albeit a 
diminished one. [para. 69]
In this case, the Court of Appeal found the subject-
matter of the search, or “what the police were 
really  after”, was “information about the 
[accused’s] residency and their comings and 
goings.”  The police wanted basic information such 
as the fact of residency in the building and the unit 
number of a suspect: 
This is information that would be available to 
the police and in public view if, for example, 
the police followed someone home to a 
detached house. A person’s physical address is 
not personal information that attracts Charter 
protection. The police also wanted to determine 
the direction that the suspects’ units faced, so 
they could conduct surveillance inside or 
outside the building without detection.
“Once it is determined that the accused has a reasonable expectation of privacy, a 
warrantless search that intrudes on that expectation will be presumptively 
unreasonable. The onus is on the Crown to show that the search was authorized by 
law. The authorizing law must be reasonable, and the search must have been 
conducted in a reasonable manner.”
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After these basic facts had been established, 
the police were interested in obtaining 
information about the [accused’s] comings and 
goings – whether they were at home (when the 
police checked to see if their cars were parked 
in the garage), who they visited and who 
visited them, what they were carrying, and 
how long they stayed during these visits. 
Although any individual observation made 
from the physical surveillance might be 
characterized as “mundane”, the surveillance 
observations together and over time produced 
more invasive information about what 
happened in and around the [accused’s] 
homes. [references omitted, paras. 76-77]
Warrantless Garage Entries
In this case, the garage  entries did not engage s. 8 
of the Charter:
[T]he parking garages in both Joe Shuster Way 
and Western Battery Road were large, and the 
[accused] had limited control over them. The 
Western Battery Road garage had a visitors’ 
section that was accessible to the general 
public. As explained below, the police 
obtained consent before all prolonged 
surveillance in the Joe Shuster Way garage. 
While there is insufficient evidence of consent 
in relation to Western Battery Road, such 
consent was not necessary as the police 
generally entered the visitors’ section to 
determine whether a target’s car was parked in 
the garage or not, which they were 
entitled to do as any visitor could do. 
The [accuseds’] had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy regarding 
observations made from a space 
accessible to the general public. Even if 
the [accuseds] had a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the garage, 
that expectation was not objectively 
reasonable. [para. 80]
Warrantless Hallway Entries 
As for the  hallway entries, the accuseds had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the hallways 
of their respective buildings, although it was at the 
low end of the spectrum:
O n c e i n s i d e a n a c c e s s - c o n t r o l l e d 
condominium building, residents are entitled 
to expect a degree of privacy greater than 
what, for instance, they would expect when 
approaching the building from the outside. This 
results from the fact that anyone can view the 
building from the outside, but there is some 
level of control over who enters the building.
The level of expectation of privacy inside a 
condominium building will vary. The level of 
expectation of privacy is dependent on the 
likelihood that someone might enter a certain 
area of the building, and whether a person 
might reasonably expect a certain area to be 
subject to camera surveillance.
Some areas of condominium buildings are 
routinely accessed by all condominium 
residents, such as the parking garage or 
elevator lobby.  The level of expectation of 
privacy in those areas is low, albeit remaining 
greater than would be expected outside of the 
building.  The level of expectation of privacy 
increases the closer the area comes to a 
person’s residence, such as the end of a 
particular hallway of a particular floor of the 
“The level of expectation of privacy inside a condominium building will vary. The 
level of expectation of privacy is dependent on the likelihood that someone might 
enter a certain area of the building, and whether a person might reasonably 
expect a certain area to be subject to camera surveillance.”
Charter of Rights
s. 8 Everyone has the right to be 
secure against unreasonable 
search or seizure. 
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building. Even in those less-frequented areas 
the level of expectation of privacy is low, but 
not as low as in the more commonly used 
areas.
A res ident or occupant ’s reasonable 
expectations surrounding camera surveillance 
in a condominium building depend on whether 
the cameras are visible, and whether the 
r e s i d e n t h a s b e e n i n f o r m e d by t h e 
condominium management as to the location 
of any security cameras installed in the 
building.   If there is no visible camera, and if 
the resident has been told that there are no 
security cameras, then residents are entitled to 
expect their movements are not subject to 
camera surveillance.
The only time that condominium residents 
should expect complete privacy is when they 
are inside their unit with the door closed. As 
soon as they open their door, or exit their unit, 
it is reasonable to expect that they may be 
observed, with that level of expectation 
increasing the closer they get to the main areas 
of the building or to any security cameras.
On balance, the factors listed above establish a 
low, but reasonable expectation of privacy in 
these common areas. The buildings had strict 
security features designed to exclude outsiders, 
and the condominium rules at Joe Shuster Way 
barred non-owners and non-occupants from 
acces s ing the common a reas un le s s 
accompanied by an owner or occupant. It was 
thus reasonable for the [accused] to believe 
that the buildings’ security systems would 
operate to exclude the police from entering the 
common areas of the building multiple times 
without permission. At the Joe Shuster Way 
building, security cameras are installed in the 
lobby, the ramp to the parking garage, at the 
elevator lobby, and in the elevators – but not in 
the hallways outside units. The [accused] had 
some limited reasonable expectation of privacy 
in those areas. [paras. 82-87]
The accused’s reasonable expectation of privacy in 
these hallways was low. Both condominium 
buildings had over 300 units. The police 
observations in this case — the subject matter of 
the search — were limited. The police did not make 
or attempt to make any observations about things 
happening within the  units or enter private areas 
such as storage lockers.
Consent
Justice Tulloch found third party consent to the 
police entries – in this case the property 
management or the condominium board – was an 
important aspect of the “totality of the 
circumstances”. Although third-party consent to 
police entry into a shared residential space is 
unsettled, in the context of the condominium 
operations the accused “would have reasonably 
expected that the board, and by extension, 
property management, could consent to police 
entry”:
The condominium corporation has a statutory 
duty to administer the common elements and 
to manage the property of the corporation on 
behalf of the owners: Condominium Act, 1998, 
S.O. 1998, c. 19, ss. 17(1), 17(2). The board is 
elected by the owners to manage these affairs 
in their best interests: ss. 27-28. This statutory 
duty can be understood as conferring a 
responsibility and authority on the board to act 
as the decision maker for the owners as a 
collective.
“Some areas of condominium buildings are routinely accessed by all 
condominium residents, such as the parking garage or elevator lobby. The level of 
expectation of privacy in those areas is low, albeit remaining greater than would 
be expected outside of the building. The level of expectation of privacy increases 
the closer the area comes to a person’s residence, such as the end of a particular 
hallway of a particular floor of the building. Even in those less-frequented areas 
the level of expectation of privacy is low, but not as low as in the more commonly 
used areas.”
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The condominium board and, by extension, 
property management, were entrusted with 
security of the building and the residents. The 
[accuseds] would have reasonably expected 
that the property manager could consent to 
police entry into the building and its hallways 
and, in fact, would be likely to consent to 
police entry if informed of the possibility of 
criminal activity within the building.
I emphasize that the authority of the 
condominium board and property management 
to regulate access to the building is just that: an 
authority to regulate access. As I will discuss in 
the context of the warrantless camera 
installations, the authority to consent to police 
entry does not translate into an authority to 
consent to more intrusive police investigative 
measures, such as entry into a particular 
condominium unit.
Accordingly, the [accused’s] expectation of 
privacy with respect to the common areas is 
further reduced given the possibility that 
property management could consent to police 
entry. The [accused] had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, albeit on the low end of 
the spectrum. [paras. 91-94]
Joe Shuster Way Condominium
Property management at Joe  Shuster Way validly 
consented to the police entries and therefore  the 
entries were authorized by law. The board had the 
authority to provide consent for police entry and 
the property manager had the authority to provide 
consent. The condominium board entrusted the 
property manager with management of the 
property, including its security. The police had 
obtained the property manager’s consent to access 
the Joe Shuster Way property  a day prior to the first 
entry  into the garage, and more than a month prior 
to the first entry into the hallways or stairwells. 
• The property  manager was aware  of his right 
to refuse to give consent and was aware that 
the police required access to both the garage 
and the building. 
• The manager gave police a key fob and access 
code that could be used at both the garage 
entrance and the front lobby door. 
• The manager clearly understood that both he 
and nearly  all the  residents of the building 
were innocent bystanders, and the police 
required their help. 
• While the police had deliberately misstated 
the nature of the investigation to the manager 
in order not to compromise the investigation, 
his evidence was that the specific  crime under 
investigation did not matter to him. In the 
circumstances of this case, the provision of 
inaccurate  information about the offence 
under investigation did not affect the validity 
of the property manager’s consent.
“The warrantless hallway entries at Joe  Shuster 
Way conducted after the consent was provided did 
not violate s. 8 of the Charter,” said Justice Tulloch. 
“The [accuseds] had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy  in the hallways, which was attenuated by 
the ability of the board and property management 
to consent to police entry. Property management 
in fact consented. Accordingly, the resulting search 
was authorized by property management’s 
consent. Section 8 of the Charter was not 
violated.”
Western Battery Road Condominium
There was insufficient evidence to conclude that 
the police  had consent to enter Western Battery 
Road. There was no evidence from the property 
manager or board on the circumstances 
surrounding the giving of consent. Since the Crown 
failed to establish  consent on a balance of 
probabilities they could not rely  on it to authorize 
the warrantless hallway entries at Western Battery 
Road. Nor could the Crown justify the warrantless 
entries on any other statutory or common law 
authority. Thus, the search was not authorized by 
law and breached s. 8.
Surreptitious Hallway Video Recording 
Two of the accused who resided in the 
condominium building where a hidden hallway 
camera had been installed had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy against such surreptitious 
video recording. Although they had a low but 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the hallways of 
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their building in relation to police entering and 
observing, they had a higher expectation of privacy 
against the state  surreptitiously  recording in the 
same hallways.
As t he app l i ca t i on j udge ob se r ved , 
condominium residents may, on occasion, be 
subjected to video surveillance from cameras 
installed by the property management in 
common areas of their buildings, and these 
inconveniences are to be expected. Indeed, 
there were such cameras in some locations of 
the common areas of Joe Shuster Way. It does 
not follow that residents would reasonably 
expect to be secretly recorded by the state. 
Both the fact that the camera was hidden and 
that it was installed and operated by police 
distinguish it from regular security cameras. The 
[accused] have different expectations of privacy 
in these different situations. [para. 124]
And further:
. . . Whi le i t migh t be a rguab le tha t 
condominium residents could not reasonably 
expect that building management would be 
unable to share with the police video 
recordings from cameras that management had 
installed for its own purposes, it does not 
follow that residents would reasonably expect 
building management to permit the police to 
install cameras for the police’s own purposes.
The installation of hidden cameras by the state 
is not something that condominium residents 
would reasonably expect the board to do in 
carrying out its management duties.
Condominium residents expect the board to 
reasonably cooperate with the police as part of 
the board’s duty to manage common areas in 
the residents’ collective interest. This 
expectation does not give the board free reign 
to consent to all manner of police investigative 
steps in the common areas of the building, no 
matter how intrusive.
Second, as the [accused] argue, the evidence 
before the application judge was that 
surveillance cameras installed by condominium 
management are generally visible. As the 
[accused] submit, while residents expect to be 
under surveillance by the visible cameras 
installed by management, they do not expect to 
be under surveillance by “hidden cameras,” 
much less hidden cameras installed by the 
police.
Furthermore, the nature of the information the 
police were seeking engaged heightened 
privacy interests. As the [accused] put it, the 
camera never blinks. Continuous surveillance 
over an extended period of time reveals more 
personal information about its subjects than do 
discrete and purpose-oriented individual 
entries. By the point the cameras were 
installed, the police had already determined 
where Mr. Mai resided, and were now pursuing 
information about who he associated with, and 
his living patterns in terms of when and how 
often he frequented the unit. As the application 
judge noted, this evidence had “considerable 
probative value” because it revealed the 
frequency of Mr. Mai’s attendance at the unit, 
what he was carrying with him when he came 
and went, and which persons he associated 
with. [paras. 124-129]
Consent - Hidden Hallway Camera
Although the police purportedly obtained the 
consent to install the hidden hallway camera, the 
Court of Appeal concluded that the condominium 
board could not consent to such surreptitious video 
recording:
In this case, the heightened privacy interests at 
stake lead me to conclude that surreptitious 
recordings cannot be authorized by the consent 
of the condominium board or property 
management. Permanent recording creates a 
risk of a different order of magnitude than 
visual observation by police officers who have 
the permission of the board or management to 
be in the common areas.
As discussed with respect to the warrantless 
entries, the board and property management 
have valid authority to cooperate with the 
police, and to consent on behalf of the building 
residents to allow police entry. This authority is 
not unlimited. The respondent, in its factum, 
agrees that property management has authority 
to cooperate with the police only to a 
reasonable extent.
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It was not reasonable for the condominium 
board or its delegates to consent to surreptitious 
video surveillance on behalf of the residents. 
This is beyond the bounds of its authority. The 
board has a duty to manage common areas. 
This will sometimes involve allowing non-
residents such as maintenance people, 
management, and perhaps even police, to enter 
common areas as needed. Surreptitious video 
surveillance by the police is different. There is a 
limit to the board’s delegated authority. That 
limit was surpassed when the board purported 
to consent to the installation of hidden cameras 
on behalf of residents. [paras. 130-132]
Since there was no other statutory or common law 
power that authorized the police to install hidden 
cameras without a warrant, the  warrantless 
installation of the  camera at Joe Shuster Way 
violated s. 8 because it was not authorized by law.
Admissibility
After considering the three factor admissibility 
assessment under s. 24(2), the Court of Appeal 
admitted the evidence obtained from the 
warrantless installation of the hidden video camera. 
The Charter-infringing state conduct was not overly 
serious and favoured admission. The police sought 
and obtained consent from the condominium 
management and sought advice from the Ministry 
of the Attorney General. The cameras were also not 
installed out of convenience but to minimize the 
danger to police. The police also placed the 
cameras to minimize the impact on others in the 
building. As for the impact of the breach on 
Charter-protected interests of the accused, it was 
moderate, which favoured exclusion. Although the 
camera revealed some personal information, it was 
available for public observation. And the accused’s 
expectation of privacy in the hallway was 
diminished. Finally, society’s interest in the 
adjudication of the case on its merits favoured 
admission. The evidence was highly reliable and 
the offences serious. “Weighing all the factors, the 
repute  of the justice system would be adversely 
affected if the evidence were to be excluded,” said 
Justice Tulloch. “Taken together, these factors 
militate in favour of admission.”
The accused’s appeals against conviction were 
dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s Note: This case contained several issues 
beyond the warrantless police entries and 
installation of the hallway video cameras.
EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE DUE 
TO 3-HOUR DELAY IN 
FACILITATING COUNSEL
R. v. Noel, 2019 ONCA 860
The police obtained a warrant — 
based on confidential information 
and surveillance — to search the 
accused’s residence for cocaine, 
other controlled substances, and 
related evidence of drug trafficking. He lived with 
his partner and his brother, and all three were 
suspected of small-scale cocaine trafficking. When 
the warrant was executed police used a dynamic 
entry. The accused was arrested at gunpoint in a 
bedroom containing his belongings and 
identification. He was taken to the floor and 
“It was not reasonable for the condominium board or its delegates to consent to 
surreptitious video surveillance on behalf of the residents. This is beyond the 
bounds of its authority. The board has a duty to manage common areas. This will 
sometimes involve allowing non-residents such as maintenance people, 
management, and perhaps even police, to enter common areas as needed. 
Surreptitious video surveillance by the police is different. There is a limit to the 
board’s delegated authority. That limit was surpassed when the board purported 
to consent to the installation of hidden cameras on behalf of residents.”
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handcuffed. His partner and his brother were also 
arrested. The accused was not immediately advised 
of his  his right to counsel. Instead, he was brought 
to a central location in the house where, within five 
minutes of police entry into the residence, he was 
read his right to counsel. He asked to speak to a 
lawyer, but no steps were taken to facilitate access 
to counsel.
Police found $5,670 
CAD, $71 USD, 73 grams 
of cocaine, 55 grams of 
marijuana, and a digital 
scale  in the bedroom. The 
accused was transported 
to the police  station but 
no one facilitated his right to counsel. Calls to duty 
counsel were made by  police and messages were 
left requesting duty counsel call back.  
Ontario Superior Court of Justice 
The judge ruled the accused’s right to 
consult counsel without delay was 
violated because of an implementational 
breach. Although she characterized the 
police conduct as “carelessness”, the  judge refused 
to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2). She found 
the seriousness of the breach was attenuated 
because  the police complied with their  obligation 
to hold off questioning the accused until after 
contact with counsel was facilitated. Further, the 
judge found there was no evidence the accused’s s. 
10(b) right to counsel was denied even though 
there  was no evidence to establish whether duty 
counsel ever called back. Nor was there evidence 
that the delay adversely impacted the accused’s 
ability to have a meaningful conversation with 
counsel. The  accused was convicted of drug related 
offences.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued, among 
other things, that the  trial judge 
erred in not excluding the 
evidence under s. 24(2). The 
Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge erred 
in assessing the seriousness and impact of the s. 
10(b) implementational breach related to police 
delay in facilitating  the accused’s right to counsel. 
As for the seriousness of the breach, it was not 
lessened because the police did not question the 
accused:
First, had the police attempted to use [the 
accused] as a source of self-incriminating 
evidence before he had a reasonable 
opportunity to speak to counsel, that would 
have been yet another s. 10(b) breach. The 
seriousness of the breach the trial judge did 
find cannot be attenuated by the fact that the 
police did not commit an additional breach of 
[the accused’s] rights.
Second, there is no evidence that [the accused] 
ever succeeded in speaking to counsel. The 
evidence was that at 1:25 a.m., approximately 
three hours after his arrest, [an officer] left a 
message with duty counsel on [the accused’s] 
behalf, but there was no evidence that anyone 
followed up to ensure contact occurred. It is 
true that the onus is on [the accused] to 
establish the s. 10(b) breach, and that he did 
not lead affirmative evidence that he never 
managed to speak to counsel. That does not 
change the fact, though, that there is no 
affirmative proof that he did. It was not 
appropriate for the trial judge to proceed on the 
assumption that [the accused] did ultimately 
speak to counsel. It was also not appropriate for 
the trial judge to conclude that the seriousness 
of the breach was mitigated by that assumed 
consultation. [paras. 19-20]
TIMELINE
10:28 pm Search warrant executed.
11:04 pm Accused transported to police station.
11:10 pm Accused arrives at police station.
12:48 am  Two calls placed to duty counsel & messages 
left asking for call back.
1:25 am Accused had not yet received call from duty 
counsel. Call placed to duty counsel & 
message left asking for call back. 
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As for the impact of the breach on the  accused, 
the Appeal Court concluded that the trial judge did 
not properly evaluate this aspect:
[The Charter protected] interest is the right is to 
consult counsel without delay. The loss of this 
right is in no way neutralized because the right 
to consult counsel is delayed, as opposed to 
denied. Nor is the impact of delayed access to 
counsel neutralized where an accused fails to 
demonstrate that the delay caused them to be 
unable to have a late but meaningful 
conversation with counsel. It would be 
inconsistent with solicitor-client privilege to 
expect a detainee to lead evidence about the 
quality of their solicitor-client conversation. 
More importantly, this inquiry misses the mark.
The right to consult counsel without delay 
exists because those who are arrested or 
detained are apt to require immediate legal 
advice that they cannot access without help, 
because of their detention.
For example, an arrest and the search of one’s 
home can raise urgent legal issues about the 
lawfulness of the arrest and the obligation to 
submit, as well as the validity of the search 
warrant and the scope of authority that the 
search warrant gives to the police. Such 
information could be useful in preventing an 
unjustified search, before it happens.  
Detention also raises questions of immediate 
importance relating to the detainee’s rights 
during detention, including the right against 
self-incrimination.
Beyond this, the right to counsel is also 
important in providing “reassurance” and 
advice, on such questions as how long the 
detention is apt to last, and what can or should 
be done to regain liberty. ... [References 
omitted, paras. 22-26]
“[The accused] was not required to offer direct 
evidence about why he required access to counsel 
without delay,” said the Court of Appeal. “He 
asked to speak to counsel promptly but that right 
was denied. In assessing the impact of such 
breaches, it is not appropriate for courts to plumb 
the content and significance of the conversations a 
detainee would have had, if his right to consult 
counsel without delay had been respected, or to 
treat such breaches as ‘quite  neutral’ in the 
absence of such evidence. The impact of the  loss of 
the right to consult counsel without delay can be 
evaluated based on the interests it is meant to 
protect along with the length of the delay.”
s. 24(2) of the Charter
Since the trial judge erred in her analysis, the Court 
of Appeal did a fresh s. 24(2) determination and 
came to a different conclusion on admissibility.
Seriousness of the Charter Breach
Here, the s. 10(b) violation was serious. The 
accused was entirely under the control of the 
police. No one took  charge of ensuring the accused 
had access to counsel as he requested. He was 
placed in a  cell and left there. Three hours lapsed 
between the time of the accused’s arrest and the 
first confirmed attempt by the police to secure 
counsel for him. And there was then no 
confirmation that the accused actually spoke to 
counsel. “From the beginning, the police appear to 
have had a somewhat cavalier attitude about a 
fundamental, important, and long-settled Charter 
right to consult counsel without delay,” said the 
Court of Appeal. 
“The right to consult counsel without delay exists because those who are arrested 
or detained are apt to require immediate legal advice that they cannot access 
without help, because of their detention.”
“[T]he right to counsel is also important in providing ‘reassurance’ and advice, on 
such questions as how long the detention is apt to last, and what can or should be 
done to regain liberty.”
Volume 20 Issue 1 ~ January/February 2020
PAGE 16
Impact of Charter Breach
The impact of the breach on the accused’s Charter 
protected interests was significant, not neutral. As 
the Court of Appeal emphasized, “[the accused] 
remained in custody without the benefit of counsel 
for at least three hours, unable to receive the 
direction, reassurance, and advice that counsel 
could provide,” 
Admissibility?
Despite its reliability and the necessity to proving 
the Crown’s case, the evidence was excluded. The 
Court of Appeal was not prepared to be seen as 
condoning the “carelessness and disorganization” 
of the police in not facilitating the accused’s right to 
counsel without delay. “This was a  clear violation 
of a well-established rule,” it stated. “The law 
around s. 10(b) is clear and long-settled. It is not 
difficult for the police to understand their 
obligations and carry them out. Furthermore, it is 
troubling that the police in this case could not 
provide any reasonable explanation for the delay, 
nor could they even say  whether [the accused] did, 
in fact, speak to counsel.”  
  
The accused’s appeal was allowed, the evidence 
was excluded, his conviction was set aside and 
verdicts of acquittal were entered. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
NO-KNOCK ENTRY JUSTIFIED: 
EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE
R. v. Chang, 2019 ABCA 315
 
Following an investigation into a dial-
a-dope operation, the police obtained 
a Controlled Drugs and Substances 
Act (CDSA) search warrant to be 
executed at the accused’s apartment 
by way of  a “no-knock” entry. The search of the 
accused’s residence was to be followed by searches 
at two other homes. A 10 member tactical team 
attended the accused’s apartment and forced the 
door open using a two-man ram. The first officer to 
enter had his pistol drawn and announced “police” 
and then “search warrant”. The officer then entered 
the bedroom occupied by the accused. 
The accused was directed to show his hands and 
then to come towards the officer. As the accused 
crawled across the bed and stood up in front of the 
officer, his fists were clenched. The accused was 
directed to get on the ground. The officer 
administered an open-hand stun with his left hand 
to the right side of the accused’s head and took him 
to the ground. He was then directed to bring his 
hands behind his back while the officer’s knee was 
pressed to his back. The accused brought his right 
hand behind his back in a clenched fist. When 
directed to unclench his fist, he declined to do so 
and the officer administered an open-hand stun to 
his upper shoulder blades. The accused complied 
and unclenched his fist, following which the officer 
took control of the accused’s right wrist. 
The accused was then handcuffed, advised of his 
Charter rights, cautioned, and informed that he was 
being detained for a CDSA warrant. He was 
transported to a police station were  he was 
subsequently arrested and allowed to contact a 
lawyer after all related searches had been 
completed. During the course of the search, the 
police located a total of 312.6 grams of cocaine 
and $110,950 in bundled cash at various locations 
in the master bedroom. He was charged with 
possessing cocaine  for the  purpose of trafficking 
and possessing proceeds of crime.
“The law around s. 10(b) is clear and 
long-settled. It is not difficult for the 
police to understand their obligations 
and carry them out.”
INTERNATIONAL DAY FOR THE 
ELIMINATION OF RACIAL 
DISCRIMINATION 
March 21, 2020
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Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
Among other things, the accused argued 
that the police breached his ss. 7 and 8 
Charter rights by using a no-knock entry 
and by using excessive force during his 
arrest. In upholding the manner of the entry, the 
judge concluded the police had reasonable 
grounds to be concerned about officer safety and 
the preservation of evidence:
• The police conducted two risk  assessments 
relative to the manner of entry in accordance 
with established protocol;
• The police considered whether less drastic forms 
of entry would achieve their objectives 
regarding officer safety and preserving evidence;
• Following an investigation, the police 
reasonably believed that the accused’s residence 
was being used to store and distribute illicit 
drugs;
• There were multiple warrants being executed on 
the  same morning increasing the risk of 
someone alerting the accused and thereby 
jeopardizing officer safety and the preservation 
of evidence; and
• The presence of weapons was not uncommon in 
drug investigations and the individuals under 
investigation had ties to an organized crime 
group with a history of violence.
The judge also found the force used during the 
arrest was reasonable. He stated:
I accept the evidence of [the officer] that the 
[accused] maintained his hands in a clenched 
fist notwithstanding the repeated directions to 
the contrary given during the course of the 
arrest. In my view, the minimal force used by 
[the officer] was objectively reasonable under 
the circumstances. [The officer] struck the 
[accused] once with an open hand in each of 
the three instances when the [accused] failed to 
comply with a direction to unclench his fists. 
On each occasion, the force was measured and 
modes t and immedia te ly resu l ted in 
compliance. He used an open-hand stun 
technique, once to the head and twice to the 
shoulder blades, to secure compliance. There is 
no evidence that the [accused] sustained any 
injury as a result of these stun techniques. 
Indeed, he offered no evidence as to the 
amount of force employed or the impact of 
such force. ...
In my view, the amount of force employed was 
objectively reasonable in each instance given 
the circumstances confronting [the officer] at 
the time. As such, I find that the force 
employed to affect the arrest of the [accused] 
was in accordance with s. 25 of the Criminal 
Code. Having found that the amount of force 
employed to effect the arrest was reasonable, I 
am not satisfied that the [accused] has 
established a breach of either ss. 7 or 8 of the 
Charter on that basis. ... [R. v. Chang, 2017 
ABQB 348 at para. 128]
The accused failed to establish a breach of either ss. 
7 or 8 as a  result of the forced entry into his 
residence nor did he establish a s. 7 breach on the 
basis that the  police used excessive force in 
effecting his arrest. The evidence was admitted and 
the accused was convicted of possessing cocaine 
for the purpose of trafficking and sentenced to four 
years’ in prison.
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused contended, in part, 
that the trial judge erred in not 
finding his ss. 7 and 8 Charter 
rights had been breached by the 
manner of the police search and 
arrest. In his view, the police did not have 
reasonable grounds to execute a “no-knock entry” 
and in doing so, violated his s. 8 Charter right to be 
secure from unreasonable search and seizure. 
Moreover, he suggested that the force used against 
him was unnecessary, excessive and gratuitous.
“A search is only reasonable where it is authorized by law, where the authorizing 
law is itself reasonable, and where the search was conducted in a reasonable 
manner.”
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Manner of Search
The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s finding 
that the “no-knock entry” was reasonable. “A 
search is only reasonable where it is authorized by 
law, where the authorizing law is itself reasonable, 
and where the search was conducted in a 
reasonable manner,” said Justices Schutz and 
Antonio for the unanimous Appeal Court. 
Unless there are “exigent circumstances”, the 
police must knock and announce before forcing 
entry  into a dwelling house. When a “no-knock” or 
“hard entry” is conducted, the Crown bears the 
onus of demonstrating necessity. “Specifically, to 
substantiate  ‘exigent circumstances’, the Crown 
must provide evidence showing that the police had 
‘reasonable grounds to be concerned about the 
possibility of harm to themselves or occupants, or 
about the destruction of evidence’,” said the Court 
of Appeal. “The decision by the police must be 
judged by what was or should reasonably have 
been known at the time [and] the police must be 
afforded some latitude in the manner in which 
they choose to enter the premises.” 
The factors the trial judge identified in concluding 
that the police had reasonable grounds to be 
concerned about officer safety  and the preservation 
of evidence were entitled to deference. He made 
no errors of law or principle and his assessment 
and determination was reasonable. 
Force Used During Arrest
The accused’s contention that the trial judge erred 
in failing to find that the police had used excessive 
force in effectinghis  arrest, thereby breaching ss. 7 
and 8 of the Charter, was also rejected. The open-
handed strike to the accused’s head and two to his 
shoulders were not unnecessary.
“Section 25(1) of the Criminal Code ... provides 
that police officers may, in effecting an arrest, 
‘[use] as much force as necessary’,” said Justices 
Schutz and Antonio. “Similar language is found in 
s 12 of the CDSA which authorizes officers to use 
‘as much force as i s necessary in the 
circumstances’ when executing a  CDSA search 
warrant.” They continued:
[I]n assessing whether or not a police officer 
has acted within the limits of the law, the 
Crown must demonstrate that the officer:
(i) was required or authorized by law to 
perform an action in the administration or 
enforcement of the law;
(ii) acted on reasonable grounds in performing 
that action; and
(iii) did not use unnecessary force. [para. 94]
Here, the accused argued the force used was 
unnecessary. Noting the applicable standard is 
“whether the application of force was objectively 
reasonable in the circumstances”, the Court of 
Appeal concluded the trial judge did not err in so 
finding:
The trial judge accepted the evidence of [the 
officer] over the evidence of the [accused] 
where the evidence conflicted, and found that 
the [accused] had his hands clenched as he 
approached [the officer], thus prompting a 
single open-handed strike to the [accused’s] 
head forcing him to the ground. The [accused] 
then brought his right hand behind his back, 
also clenched, and ignored [the officer’s] 
instructions to unclench it, thus provoking a 
second strike to his shoulder blades. The same 
thing occurred with the [accused’s] left hand, 
prompting the third and final strike. [The 
officer] perceived the clenched fists as “a 
threatening gesture” and the open-handed 
strikes were a “stun technique” employed to 
secure compliance. In short, [the officer’s] 
“[T]o substantiate ‘exigent circumstances’, the Crown must provide evidence 
showing that the police had ‘reasonable grounds to be concerned about the 
possibility of harm to themselves or occupants, or about the destruction of 
evidence’.”
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application of force was in direct response to a 
perceived threat which could not be resolved 
through verbal commands due to the 
[accused’s] non-compliance.
While the perceived threat can arguably be 
characterized as modest, the trial judge found 
that the responding amount of force used was 
also “measured and modest”. He also noted 
that the [accused] did not sustain any injuries 
as a result. In light of these facts, the trial judge 
concluded that the amount of force used was 
objectively reasonable in the circumstances. 
In our view, the trial judge committed no error, 
much less a palpable and overriding error. Even 
if it can be said that [the officer] used more 
force than was strictly necessary, police officers 
are not required to use the least amount of 
force necessary to achieve a desired result. 
They must be afforded a degree of latitude with 
respect to their judgment of the degree of force 
necessary in the exigency of the moment. As 
the Supreme Court cautioned in R. v 
Nasogaluak [2010 SCC 6], “[p]olice actions 
should not be judged against a standard of 
perfection”. [some references omitted, paras. 
96-98]
The no-knock entry was reasonable in the 
circumstances, as was the officer’s use of force 
during the arrest. The accused’s appeal was 
dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Editor’s Note: Additional details taken from R. v. 
Chang, 2017 ABQB 348.
RESIDENTIAL ENTRY LAWFUL 
DUE TO SAFETY CONCERNS
R. v. Okemow, 2019 MBCA 37                 
 
After consuming alcohol and drugs, 
three  men left the second floor of a 
rooming house where they became 
involved in a verbal confrontation 
with the accused and two other men. 
The accused and associates had been drinking in 
the main floor and yard of the  rooming house. After 
the confrontation, the three men left and were 
walking to a beer vendor. As they were  walking  on 
the sidewalk, someone fired shots at them. One of 
the men was hit and died of a single gunshot 
wound to the base of his head.  Another man 
sustained a gunshot wound to his leg while the 
third man was able to escape unharmed.
Shortly after the shooting police responded to a 
911 call. They attended the scene and found a 
bullet casing across the street from where the 
deceased was located. Later that day the police 
received two calls relating to a  male being sighted 
with a gun. Each of these calls reported the 
sightings to be  within the direct vicinity of each 
other and in the area where the earlier shooting 
had occurred. When responding to the second gun 
sighting call, the police observed the accused 
outside of, and entering into, a residence. He was 
acting suspiciously. He appeared to be trying to 
hide something behind his back. He was shuffling 
sideways on the landing and entering the residence 
without turning his back to police. 
The police attended the residence and were 
allowed entry. The accused and a number of other 
individuals were  inside. As a result of further police 
investigation, the accused was detained and the 
residence was cleared. A live bullet was located on 
the stairs to the basement and a rifle  with a casing 
inside it was found in the basement.  Police also 
located a sawed-off, 12-gauge shotgun in the 
basement. Although documents relating to several 
other people were found in the residence, no 
documents related to the accused were found. Nor 
did the accused have a key on him when he was 
arrested. He was subsequently charged with second 
degree murder and attempted murder.
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused argued, among other things, 
that the search of his residence breached 
his s.8 Charter right to be free from 
unreasonable search and seizure.  The 
judge found the accused did not have standing to 
bring a s. 8 application.  The landlord said that the 
residence had been leased to another individual 
and the names of other people allowed to live at 
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the residence were set out in the lease  agreement, 
But the accused’s name was not included on the 
list. Further, the  landlord did not know the accused 
or of his presence at the residence, nor had he 
given the accused a key. 
And, even if the accused did have standing, the 
judge found the  police search lawful. Although the 
search was warrantless and therefore presumptively 
unreasonable, it was authorized under the common 
law. The police were dealing with “an unknown, 
unpredictable, and potentially dangerous 
situation”, and it was reasonable for them to search 
the residence for other persons pursuant to their 
common law duty to keep the peace and preserve 
life. In addition, the search was carried out in a 
reasonable manner. Finally, even if the search was 
unreasonable, the admission of the evidence would 
not bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute. The accused was convicted by a jury of 
second degree murder and attempted murder in 
relation to the shooting. 
Manitoba Court of Appeal
The accused argued, in part, that 
the police violated his rights 
under s. 8 when they conducted 
a warrantless search of the 
residence in which he was located. He submitted 
that the  trial judge erred in concluding that he did 
not have standing to assert a s. 8 breach, that the 
search was lawful, and that the evidence should not 
have been excluded under s. 24(2).
Standing?
Before a court determines whether a  search was 
unreasonable under s. 8 of the Charter, an accused 
must first establish standing to argue one’s case. To 
do this, an accused must demonstrate that they had 
a reasonable  expectation of privacy in the place 
searched or the item seized. In determining 
whether an accused has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy, a court will examine the totality of the 
circumstances. This includes an accused’s 
subjective expectation of privacy along with the 
objective reasonableness of that expectation. 
In this case, Justice Cameron, speaking for a 
unanimous Court of Appeal, ruled that while  the 
accused had a subjective  expectation of privacy in 
the residence he  had not established that his 
expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable. 
Although the accused was present at the time of the 
search and appeared to exercise  some degree of 
control over the residence by  allowing the police 
entry, he was not the owner of the residence, did 
not lease it, and was not listed on the lease as a 
person who was permitted to reside there. The 
landlord also testified that he did not know the 
accused nor had he ever met him. The landlord had 
not given the  accused a  key to the residence and 
did not receive any  rent money from him. As well, 
the accused was not in possession of a  key  to the 
property upon his arrest and there was no evidence 
of the accused’s historical use of the property nor 
any evidence as to where he lived. 
The trial judge had rejected the accused’s argument 
that he had the authority to admit or exclude others 
because  he had opened the door when police 
arrived. The  trial judge accepted the evidence of a 
police officer, who testified that the accused told 
him that he stayed at the residence but that he did 
not live  there. Since the accused did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the residence 
he had no standing to make a s. 8 application.
Was the Search Lawful?
Even if the accused had standing under s. 8, Justice 
Cameron would have found the search of the 
residence lawful and reasonable. Here, the  search 
of the  residence for other people, including the 
owners or anyone who might be injured or in 
possession of a gun, was lawful pursuant to the 
common law duty and corresponding authority of 
the police to keep the peace and preserve life. The 
trial judge conducted a thorough review of the law 
and did not err in concluding  that the police were 
acting in response to a real public safety concern. 
The police actions were justifiable and supported 
by the evidence.  The police had reasonable 
grounds to search for people in the residence due 
to safety concerns. 
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Exclusion of Evidence
Since the search was reasonable, it was not 
necessary to conduct a s. 24(2) analysis. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Supreme Court of Canada
The accused sought leave to appeal the Manitoba 
Court of Appeal judgment but his application was 
dismissed (December 5, 2019). 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
EVIDENCE EXCLUDED DUE TO 
CHARTER BREACHES: ACCUSED 
ACQUITTED
R. v. Moyles, 2019 SKCA 72
The Canada Border Services Agency 
(CBSA) intercepted two boxes at the 
Vancouver International Airport, 
which were shipped from China and 
destined to “Bryan” at a residential 
address in Estevan, Saskatchewan. The packages 
were labelled as containing peppermint oil but 
when opened were found to contain six plastic 
bottles containing GBL, a precursor used to 
produce a date rape drug. GBL is not a  controlled 
substance under the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act (CDSA) and therefore it is not an 
offence to possess or traffic in it. It is as a precursor, 
however, an offence to import or export it. The 
CBSA turned the boxes over to the police. 
A telephone number on the packing slip had an 
Alberta area code and belonged to Bryan Moyles. A 
vehicle parked in the driveway with an Alberta 
licence plate displayed a “Team Industrial Services” 
logo. Bryan Moyles’ Facebook page disclosed he 
worked at a  business called “Team Industrial 
Services” and had friends in Estevan. The police 
decided to make a “controlled delivery”. 
Police swore two Informations to Obtain (ITO). One 
ITO supported a general warrant under s. 487.01 of 
the Criminal Code authorizing the police to install 
and monitor the box alarms and to enter the house 
after a box alarm was triggered. A second ITO 
supported a warrant under s. 11 of the  CDSA 
authoring entry, search and seizure. Both ITOs said 
the affiant had reasonable  grounds to believe the 
accused had committed or would commit one or 
more of three offences relating to GBL: importing, 
possession for the purpose of trafficking, and 
conspiracy to commit these offences. Both warrants 
were issued for a seven-day period to afford police 
a reasonable time frame to allow for the  delivery of 
the package. 
Covert alarms were installed in each box and the 
six bottles of GBL were  replaced with six bottles of 
water, one of which contained a small vial of GBL. 
An undercover operator posing as a  Purolator 
courier delivered the boxes to the house. A person 
who identified himself as Bryan Moyles answered 
the door, showed identification, and signed for the 
delivery. After a minute or two, the police received 
notification from one of the box alarms that a 
package had been opened. They knocked and, 
receiving no answer, broke open the front door. The 
accused, who was coming down the stairs, was 
arrested. However, he  was not provided access to 
duty  counsel until more than two hours after his 
arrest. He subsequently provided a  warned 
statement after speaking to a lawyer. He initially 
denying knowledge of the boxes but then admitted 
they belonged to him and that he had received a 
similar shipment before.
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The accused asserted that both warrants 
were invalid and, among other things, his 
ss. 8 and 10(b) Charter rights had been 
violated. He wanted both the evidence 
seized from his residence and his warned statement 
excluded under s. 24(2). The judge found the 
“Gamma-Butyrolactone (GBL) is a precursor chemical 
for Gamma-Hydroxybutyrate (GHB), which is often used 
for drug-facilitated sexual assaults.”
Source: Public Safety Canada, Canada-United States Border Drug Threat Assessment
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accused’s s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel had been 
infringed because of an unreasonable delay  (one 
hour and 45 minutes) in providing the accused 
access to counsel after safety  concerns had been 
addressed. However, the judge admitted the 
accused’s statement. 
As for the search warrants, the judge held they were 
both valid. And, even if the warrants were invalid, 
the evidence was nevertheless admissible under s. 
24(2). The accused was convicted of importing a 
precursor under the CDSA and two Customs Act 
offences, unlawfully  importing goods and 
smuggling. He was given a six-month conditional 
sentence order.
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The accused argued that both 
warrants were  invalid because 
the general warrant did not 
au tho r i ze t he con t ro l l ed 
delivery. Therefore, the search of the house was 
warrantless, breached s. 8 of the Charter and the 
evidence ought to have been excluded under s. 
24(2). He wanted his convictions quashed and 
verdicts of acquittal entered. In the alternative, he 
sought an order directing a new trial.
The General Warrant
Although the ITO for the general made it clear that 
its central purpose was to obtain authorization to 
carry out the controlled delivery, the general 
warrant itself did not contain such or similar 
language. Rather, “[the general warrant] 
authorized the police to install and maintain box 
alarms,”  said Justice Barrington-Foote. “It says 
entry into and a search of the ‘the location’ where 
‘the package’ is delivered to is not authorized until 
there were reasonable  grounds to believe [the 
accused] and/or unknown persons are or have 
been in possession of the package. It refers to the 
possibility the alarm may be activated. However, it 
does not refer to the delivery of the package by a 
peace officer at all.” Nor did the Crown argue that 
the general warrant implicitly authorized the 
controlled delivery. Since the general warrant did 
not authorize the controlled delivery, it was invalid.
The CDSA Warrant
The Court of Appeal found the CDSA warrant was 
valid despite the general warrant not authorizing 
the controlled delivery:
The CDSA ITO and warrant contain some of the 
same information as the general warrant ITO 
and general warrant but were by no means the 
same. Unlike the general warrant ITO, the 
CDSA ITO did not seek authority for the 
controlled delivery. Unlike the general warrant, 
the CDSA warrant did not say the police could 
not search the house until an alarm was 
triggered or there was evidence of actual 
possession of the package. It said there were 
reasonable grounds to believe evidence was at 
the house and authorized entry, and the search 
for and seizure of that evidence.
However, the CDSA ITO fully disclosed the link 
between the general warrant and the CDSA 
warrant. It too described the proposed 
controlled delivery, step by step, but for the 
step that involved the removal and replacement 
of most of the GBL. In particular, it said the 
investigation would include the following steps:
… “The package” will be delivered to Bryan 
Moyles or the occupant of “the location” by a 
peace officer posing as a delivery person. The 
intrusion alarm within “the package” will alert 
peace officers when “the package” has been 
opened by the recipient. Peace officers will 
enter “the location” to arrest occupants within 
for “the offences” named in this information.
[paras. 37-38]
Rather than the unauthorized controlled delivery 
rendering the  CDSA warrant invalid, the references 
to the controlled delivery and to the  general 
warrant could be excised from the CDSA ITO. 
The trial judge had concluded there  were 
reasonable  grounds to believe an importation 
offence had occurred and that that Bryan Moyles 
was a party  to that offence. As well, the trial judge 
found the CDSA warrant did not authorize an 
anticipatory search. There were sufficient 
reasonable grounds to believe there would be 
evidence related to unlawful importation in the 
house. However, the CDSA warrant was valid only 
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to the  extent it authorized a search for notes, 
address books, contents of telecommunications 
devices, and records of telephone numbers. It did 
not authorize the search for the boxes or the GBL. 
In coming to his conclusion, the trial judge did not 
err in law, misapprehend the evidence or fail to 
consider relevant evidence. His findings were owed 
deference and there was no basis to interfere with 
his decision that the evidence disclosed reasonable 
grounds to believe the offence of importing GBL 
had occurred and that evidence of that offence 
would be obtained by searching the house. This 
was so even after reviewing the  ITO as edited 
without reference to the controlled delivery or the 
general warrant.
Did the Search Breach s. 8?
The Crown bears the burden of demonstrating a 
warrantless search is authorized by a reasonable 
law and is carried out in a reasonable manner. The 
controlled delivery was a warrantless search that 
could not be  justified under the common law 
“implied licence to knock” doctrine as the Crown 
suggested. Thus, the controlled delivery was an 
unreasonable search which breached the accused’s 
s. 8 Charter right.  
However, the search of the house was authorized 
by the CDSA warrant. Although “the only evidence 
found at the house that fell within the limited 
scope of the CDSA warrant specified by  the trial 
judge was a note of an unidentified Chinese 
address found in [the accused’s] room”, the rest of 
the evidence found was properly  seized under s. 
11(6) of the CDSA. This provision allows the police 
to seize, while executing a s. 11(1) warrant, 
anything else they believe on reasonable grounds 
would afford evidence in respect of an offence 
under the CDSA. “I am aware of no authority that 
would support the conclusion that these provisions 
would not authorize the seizure of the boxes and 
GBL at the house,”  said Justice Barrington-Foote. 
“The seizure of the other evidence found in the 
house was accordingly lawful.”
s. 24(2) Charter
The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in 
his s. 24(2) analysis and therefore a fresh 
admissibility determination was required. As for the 
Charter-infringing police conduct in relation to the 
s. 8 and s. 10(b) breaches, it was serious and 
strongly favoured exclusion of evidence. As was the 
impact on the accused’s Charter-protected 
interests. Both the delay  in implementing his s. 
10(b) right to counsel and the impact of the s. 8 
breach in relation to his home, where he enjoyed 
the highest expectation of privacy, seriously 
impacted the accused and strongly favoured 
excluding the evidence. Finally, these factors could 
not be outweighed by the reliability of the evidence 
and its necessity  to the Crown’s case. As a result, 
the Court of Appeal excluded the accused’s warned 
statement; the fact he identified himself and signed 
the delivery slip, took delivery of the boxes, and 
that a box alarm was triggered shortly thereafter; 
and the boxes and other items in the house. As a 
result, there was insufficient evidence to support a 
conviction. 
The accused’s appeal was allowed, his conviction 
was set aside and an acquittal was entered.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
BY THE BOOK:
Controlled Drugs & Substances Act
Seizure of things not specified
s. 11 (6) A peace officer who executes a 
warrant issued under subsection (1) may 
seize, in addition to the things mentioned in 
the warrant,
(a)any controlled substance or precursor in 
respect of which the peace officer believes on 
reasonable grounds that this Act has been contravened;
(b) any thing that the peace officer believes on reasonable 
grounds to contain or conceal a controlled substance or 
precursor referred to in paragraph (a);
(c) any thing that the peace officer believes on reasonable 
grounds is offence-related property; or
(d) any thing that the peace officer believes on reasonable 
grounds will afford evidence in respect of an offence 
under this Act.
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UPCOMING         
EXTERNAL LEARNING 
OPPORTUNITIES
March 2, 2020    Optional Workshop: March 3, 2020
In Person or Webcast                             Click here.
March 27, 2020   
Online Replay                                      Click here.
April 3, 2020   
In Person or Webcast                             Click here.
April 25, 2020   
In Person or Webcast                             Click here.
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BC’s MINISTRY OF PUBLIC 
SAFETY RELEASES POLICE DOG 
STATISTICS
In November 2019 the Policing and Security 
Branch of BC’s Ministry  of Public Safety and 
Solicitor General released data reported to the 
Director of Police Services on the  use of police 
services dogs (PSD) for 2018. 
The total number 
of PSD locations, 
apprehens ion s 
and arrests. This included 1,739 by 
the RCMP and LMIPDS followed by 
the Vancouver Police  (522), Victoria 
Police (53), Saanich Police (32) and West 
Vancouver Police (22). 
The total number of 
subjects bitten by a 
PSD. A bite is defined 
as “a police dog’s use of mouth and 
teeth to grab or hold a person’s 
body or clothes”. The RCMP and 
LMIPDS accounted for 248 bites, followed by 
Vancouver (111), Victoria (11) and West Vancouver 
(3). There were five non-subject civilians and seven 
non-subject police officers bitten.
The total number 
o f t r a c k s o r 
s e a r c h e s f o r 
suspects. This included 3,707 by 
the RCMP and LMIPDS. Vancouver 
(1,118), Victoria (120), Saanich (71) 
and West Vancouver (39) followed.
The total number of 
apprehensions by 
bite or display . 
There were 1,047 apprehensions 
made by the RCMP and LMIPDS, 
while Vancouver made 526, followed by Victoria 
(54), West Vancouver (22) and Saanich (19).
The total number of tracks or searches 
for missing persons. 
The total number of 
searches for drugs. This 
included 332 by the 
RCMP and LMIPDS followed by 
Victoria (8) and Vancouver (8).
The to ta l number o f 
searches for explosives or 
firearms. There were 190 
by the RCMP and LMIPDS, while the 
Transit Police made 33 followed by 
Vancouver (28) and Victoria (16).
The total number of 
searches for evidence. 
This included 1,466 
by the RCMP and LMIPDS followed 
by Vancouver (32), Victoria (23), West 
Vancouver (5) and Saanich (3). 
The RCMP used a PSD twice for crowd control and 
a PSD was used for community relations or other 
events a total of 310 times by all agencies. 
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BC’s INTERMEDIATE WEAPON 
USE STATISTICS RELEASED
In November 2019 the Policing and Security 
Branch of BC’s Ministry  of Public Safety and 
Solicitor General also released the intermediate 
weapon use and firearm discharge data reported by 
BC police agencies for 2018. 
The total number of Extended Range 
Impact Weapon (ERIW) discharges by 
police (number of subjects). This is up from 
41 in 2017 and 39 in 2016.
The total number of Baton Applications by 
police (number of subjects).This is down 
from 89 in 2017 and 92 in 2016.
The total number of Conducted Energy 
Weapon (CEW) Discharges by police 
(number of subjects). This is up from 
252 in 2017 and 222 in 2016.
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The total number of Oleoresin 
Capsicum (OC) Spray Discharges by 
police (number of subjects). This is up 
from 206 in 2017 and 224 in 2016.
POLICE FIREARM DISCHARGES
The total number of Firearm Discharge 
incidents by police in an operational setting in 
2018. Three people were killed and one was 
injured. All of these incidents involved the RCMP. 
This is down from 14 in 2017 and nine  (9) in 2016. 
This is the lowest number on record since 2007. 
On average, there were 12.5 firearm discharges 
incidents per year from 2007 to 2018. During this 
same time period, there were fewer than four (4) 
deaths per year ranging from a low of zero (0) in 
2008 to a high of eight (8) in 2009. 














Police Firearm Discharge Incidents By Agency
Police Agency 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total
Abbotsford - 1 - - 1 - - - - - 1 - 3
Metro Van. Transit - - - - - - - 2 - - - - 2
New Westminster - 1 1 - - 1 - - - 1 - - 4
Port Moody - - 1 - - - - - - - - - 1
Vancouver 3 - 3 - 2 1 1 4 1 3 1 0 19
Victoria 1 - 1 - - - - 1 - - - - 3
West Vancouver - - - 1 - - - - - - - - 1
RCMP 12 11 20 8 6 8 9 10 11 5 12 5 117
Total 16 13 26 9 9 10 10 17 12 9 14 5 150
Persons-Killed 4 - 8 3 4 4 1 6 7 4 2 3 46
Persons-Injured 3 5 9 2 1 2 4 4 4 5 5 1 45
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BC COURT OF APPEAL RULES 
MLACMA PROVISION 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
R. v. Rajaratnam, 2019 BCCA 209
BC’s top court has ruled that s. 36 of the Mutual 
Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (MLACMA) 
is unconstitutional at least in so far as it related to 
criminal matters. The Crown sought the admission 
of travel history printouts for the  accused and 
another man “to prove: (a) when the person whose 
name appears on the document entered or 
departed from Thailand; (b)  the passport the 
person used; (c)  the visa used (if any); (d)  where 
the entry or departure occurred (e.g., airport or 
checkpoint); and (e) in the case of air travel, the 
flight on which the person arrived or departed.”
Section 36 would allow the  Crown to tender a 
foreign document containing hearsay (such as the 
travel history printout) for the truth of its contents 
without the need to establish the evidence falls 
within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule 
or met the requirements of the  principled approach 
to the  hearsay rule. Hearsay evidence may be 
admitted under the principled approach if indicia 
of reliability and necessity are established at a voir 
dire. Under s. 36, necessity and reliability have no 
application. The Crown only need establish the 
document was obtained in response to a mutual 
legal assistance request.
After examining the traditional and principled 
approaches to the admissibility of hearsay, the 
Court of Appeal found the  Crown could not rely on 
s. 36 for the admission of hearsay evidence at a 
criminal trial because it was not consonant with the 
principled approach. “[Section]  36 fundamentally 
alters the rules governing the admissibility of 
hearsay in a manner that is inconsistent with an 
accused’s right to a fair trial,”  said the Court of 
Appeal. It found the provision infringed ss. 7 and 
11(d) of the Charter which the Crown did not seek 
to justify under s. 1. Section 36 was declared of no 
force or effect with respect to evidence tendered by 
the Crown in a criminal trial.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
MORE ON HEARSAY
• Hearsay evidence is an out-of-court-statement 
(oral or documentary) tendered for the truth of 
its contents.
• Hearsay evidence is presumptively inadmissible 
unless it falls within an exception to the hearsay 
rule (common law or statute). Traditional 
exceptions to the  hearsay rule remain 
presumptively in place.
BY THE BOOK:
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal 
Matters Act
Foreign Records
s. 36  (1)  In a proceeding with respect to 
which Parliament has jurisdiction, a record 
or a copy of the record and any affidavit, 
certificate or other statement pertaining to 
the record made by a person who has custody or knowledge 
of the record, sent to the Minister by a state or entity in 
accordance with a Canadian request, is not inadmissible in 
evidence by reason only that a statement contained in the 
record, copy, affidavit, certificate or other statement is 
hearsay or a statement of opinion.
Probative Value
(2) For the purpose of determining the probative value of a 
record or a copy of a record admitted in evidence under this 
Act, the trier of fact may examine the record or copy, 
receive evidence orally or by affidavit, or by a certificate or 
other statement pertaining to the record in which a person 
attests that the certificate or statement is made in 
conformity with the laws that apply to a state or entity, 
whether or not the certificate or statement is in the form of 
an affidavit attested to before an official of the state or 
entity, including evidence as to the circumstances in which 
the data contained in the record or copy was written, stored 
or reproduced, and draw any reasonable inference from the 
form or content of the record or copy.
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• A hearsay exception can be challenged to 
determine whether it is supported by indicia  of 
necessity and reliability, required by the 
principled approach. The exception can be 
modified as necessary to bring it into 
compliance.
• In “rare cases”, evidence falling  within an 
existing exception may be excluded because the 
indicia of necessity and reliability are lacking in 
the particular circumstances of the case.
• If hearsay evidence does not fall under a hearsay 
exception, it may still be  admitted if indicia of 
reliability and necessity are established on a  voir 
dire.
• The onus is on the party tendering hearsay 
evidence that does not fall within one of the 
traditional exceptions to establish the necessity 
and reliability criteria on a balance of 
probabilities.
• A trial judge has a  residual discretion to exclude 
hearsay evidence even if necessity and 
reliability have been shown if its prejudicial 
effect outweighs its probative value.
See: R. v. Rajaratnam, 2019 BCCA 209
POLICE AREA-ENTRY SEARCH 
JUSTIFIED AT COMMON LAW
Langenfeld v. Toronto Police Services Board, 
2019 ONCA 716
                                                                                                         
The Toronto Police Chief instituted a 
new protocol at police headquarters 
requiring any non-police personnel 
entering  the  building for any reason 
at the public entrance, with certain 
exceptions, to pass through security screening. The 
process consisted of special constables wanding 
persons entering the building with a metal detector 
and visually examining the contents of any purses 
or bags in their possession. The bags were 
examined for dangerous items such as knives or 
other weapons. There was also an “amnesty box” 
available for persons entering the building to place 
items they had with them that they were concerned 
may pose a problem in the search. If the person 
placed an item in the amnesty box before being 
searched, there would be no consequences but the 
person would not be allowed to retrieve the item.
A Toronto resident who regularly attended Toronto 
Police Services Board (TPSB) meetings refused to 
pass through security at the entrance. He was 
denied entry into the building and could not attend 
the TPSB meeting. He brought an application 
seeking a court injunction ordering the Police Chief 
to discontinue the screening process. He alleged 
that the Police Chief had no authority to institute 
the screening process. He further argued that the 
process infringed his right of freedom of expression 
under s. 2(b) of the Charter and violated the TPSB’s 
statutory obligation to hold its meetings in public. 
In his view, the Police Chief had no lawful authority 
to subject persons who wished to attend the TPSB 
public meetings to warrantless searches for which 
there were no reasonable and probable grounds.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
A judge held that the security  measures 
applied to persons wishing to attend 
TPSB public  meetings infringed s. 2(b) of 
the Charter. First, the applicant’s 
attendance at the TPSB public meeting to listen and 
perhaps speak constituted expressive conduct. 
Second, this expressive conduct should not be 
excluded from the  protection of s. 2(b). It was not 
violent, did not threaten violence and occurred in 
an area typically permitted public access. Finally, 
the security protocol limited the applicant’s s. 2(b) 
rights by imposing  a precondition on his 
attendance at the meetings that required him to 
give up aspects of his personal privacy by 
submitting to a warrantless search, unsupported by 
any grounds. 
The judge  further held that the security process was 
not prescribed by law and therefore any 
infringement of s. 2(b) could not be justified under 
s. 1 of the Charter. Although she accepted that the 
Police Chief could, at common law, impose 
preconditions to entry, the  Police  Chief’s common 
law powers qua occupier did not extend to 
warrantless searches conducted without grounds on 
persons seeking entry to attend TPSB public 
meetings. Nor was there any statutory authority that 
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permitted the searches. The judge declared the 
practice of searching persons wishing to attend 
public TBSB meetings prior to entry to police 
headquarters in the absence of a  warrant or 
reasonable and probable grounds a s. 2(b) 
infringement that could not be justified under s. 1 
since the security protocols were not prescribed by 
law.  
Ontario Court of Appeal
The Police  Chief, supported by 
the TPSB, argued the screening 
process did not limit the 
applicant’s s. 2(b) right. And, in 
any event, it was submitted that if the applicant’s s. 
2(b) right was limited, the limit was prescribed by 
law and justified under s. 1 of the Charter.
s. 2(b) Charter
Section 2(b) of the Charter states: “Everyone has 
the following fundamental freedoms: ... (b) 
freedom of thought, belief, opinion and 
expression, including freedom of the press and 
other media of communication.”
Justice Doherty, authoring the Appeal Court’s 
decision, found the application judge correctly 
concluded that the screening procedure was a 
prima facie infringement of the  applicant’s s. 2(b) 
rights. Although not every precondition to the 
exercise of freedom of expression will necessarily 
limit the  exercise  of that right, the security protocol 
in this case did limit the applicant’s right. It was not 
a trivial or insubstantial precondition:
[A] precondition to the exercise of one’s right to 
freedom of expression can be described as 
trivial or insubstantial only if it has a truly 
minimal impact on the exercise of that right. 
For example, a requirement that persons 
wishing to attend a meeting of the TPSB enter 
through a designated entrance at Police 
Headquarters and assemble in a specified area 
at least 15 minutes before the scheduled 
commencement of the meeting would be the 
kind of logistical precondition that would not 
be viewed as a limit on s. 2(b).
The precondition imposed on [the applicant’s] 
exercise of his right to freedom of expression 
was not trivial or insubstantial. It required him 
to submit to a search of his person and personal 
belongings as a precondition to exercising his 
right to express himself by attending the 
meeting. While the security search was not as 
intrusive as many searches, it remained a very 
real interference with personal privacy and 
personal security. Simply because such 
searches have become common in today’s 
world does not mean that their impact on 
personal privacy and security has become 
trivial or insignificant. [paras. 31-32]
The Court of Appeal also rejected arguments that 
the applicant was obliged to demonstrate that the 
security protocol imposed a substantial interference 
on his right to freedom of expression or that the 
preconditions needed to affect “expressive 
content” of the activity to limit the exercise of the 
freedom of expression. “A precondition that 
effectively dissuades individuals from engaging in 
expressive activity  in which they would otherwise 
have engaged is surely as much a limit on freedom 
of expression as is one that limits the content, 
time, place or manner of expression,” said Justice 
Doherty. “[The applicant] could not express 
himself by attending the meeting of the TPSB 
without first yielding other personal rights and 
submitting to the security  protocol and the 
personal intrusions that protocol involved.” Nor 
did the availability of other means of participating 
in the TPSB meetings, such as making written 
submissions or watching the proceedings on 
YouTube, effectively eliminate the limitation 
imposed by the security protocol on the applicant’s 
s. 2(b) right. 
s. 1 Justification - Prescribed by Law
The Court of Appeal, however, concluded that the 
application judge erred in holding that the 
screening process was not prescribed by law and 
was not justified within the meaning of s. 1 of the 
Charter. In Justice  Doherty’s view, the searches 
were authorized by the Police Chief’s common law 
power, as an occupier of police headquarters, and 
the duties imposed on him as an occupier by the 
Occupiers’ Liability Act. 
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As the occupier of Police Headquarters, the Police 
Chief had the responsibility for, and control over, 
the conditions of the  building and any activities in 
it. Under the OLA he was statutorily required “to 
take such care, as in all of the circumstances was 
reasonable, to ensure  that persons entering or 
using the property  were ‘reasonably safe while on 
the premises’.” At common law, he  also had the 
powers to take the steps necessary to comply with 
the duty imposed on him by OLA. These powers 
extended “to excluding persons from the property, 
removing persons from the property, and imposing 
terms and conditions on persons while they are on 
the property”: 
The common law authority of an occupier in 
respect of the property must extend to taking 
the steps necessary to comply with the statutory 
duty imposed on the occupier by s. 3(1) of the 
OLA. It cannot be that the occupier has a duty 
to take reasonable steps to protect persons on 
the property, but no power to take those steps. 
Those steps may include the imposition of 
preconditions to entry, such as a security 
screening, if the precondition is reasonable and 
connected to maintaining the safety of persons 
on the property. [reference omitted, para. 59]
And further:
[The Police Chief’s] common law authority to 
control access to Police Headquarters to ensure 
the safety of persons in the building flows not 
from any police power, but from his status as 
an occupier. In imposing a precondition to 
entry for safety purposes, [the Police Chief] is 
performing the duty imposed on him as an 
occupier under s. 3(1) of the OLA. That same 
obligation and the same common law power 
applies to all occupiers who are subject to the 
OLA. [The Police Chief’s] status as a 
government actor is irrelevant to the nature and 
scope of his common law powers as an 
occupier of Police Headquarters. His status as a 
government actor, however, becomes 
constitutionally significant if, in the exercise of 
those common law powers, he limits the 
constitutional rights of persons seeking entry to 
Police Headquarters. [para. 61]
Here, the Police Chief’s common law powers as an 
occupier extended to requiring persons to pass 
through security screening before entering  the 
building and provided the basis for a finding that 
the state action was “prescribed by law”. The scope 
of this common law authority  was not vague nor 
was the manner in which this authority was 
exercised vague. There  was no uncertainty as to 
what the security protocol required. “[The Police 
Chief] exercised his authority in a transparent 
manner which gave anyone seeking access to 
Police Headquarters advance notice of the 
screening process and its application to all 
members of the public seeking to enter the 
building,” said Justice Doherty. “The imposition of 
the screening protocol was a reasonable measure 
taken in furtherance of [the Police Chief’s] 
obligation to take such measures to protect the 
safety of persons in Police Headquarters.”
s. 1 Justification - Reasonable Limit
In addition to being prescribed by law, the security 
protocol was also a reasonable limit on the 
applicant’s right to freedom of expression. First, the 
safety of persons attending the police building and 
the safety of persons working there was a pressing 
and substantial goal. Second, there was a rational 
connection between the screening protocol and the 
“[The Police Chief’s] common law authority to control access to Police 
Headquarters to ensure the safety of persons in the building flows not from any 
police power, but from his status as an occupier. In imposing a precondition to 
entry for safety purposes, [the Police Chief] is performing the duty imposed on 
him as an occupier under s. 3(1) of the OLA. That same obligation and the same 
common law power applies to all occupiers who are subject to the OLA. [The Police 
Chief’s] status as a government actor is irrelevant to the nature and scope of his 
common law powers as an occupier of Police Headquarters.”
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safety of persons in the police building. Third, the 
screening protocol minimally impaired the s. 2(b) 
right:
The screening process is tailored to its 
objective. It does not prevent, or even 
meaningfully delay, anyone from entering the 
building and exercising their right to freedom of 
expression by attending the meetings of the 
TPSB. It does not require individuals to identify 
themselves or provide any information to the 
authorities. The process is limited to a non-
intrusive investigation for potentially dangerous 
objects. While the process negatively impacts 
on personal privacy, the impact is relatively 
minor. There is nothing in the manner in which 
the protocol is implemented that could be 
described as discriminatory, belittling, or aimed 
at discouraging persons from entering Police 
Headquarters for whatever purpose they may 
have. The security protocol is no more than 
persons could reasonably expect to encounter 
when entering a building l ike Police 
Headquarters in a city like Toronto in 2019.
Nor, in my view, does the minimum 
impairment requirement dictate that the 
security protocol be tailored so as to not apply 
to persons seeking entry to the building for the 
purpose of attending the meeting of the TPSB. 
The safety risk to which the protocol responds 
is in no way connected to the purpose for entry. 
A security protocol at the entrance of a building 
which allows persons to declare themselves 
immune from the protocol by specifying a 
certain purpose for entering the building, 
surely, has little, if any, value as a safety 
measure.
Also, from a practical perspective, a security 
protocol at the entrance that exempted persons 
from the protocol so they could attend the TPSB 
meeting would, in all likelihood, impose even 
more restrictions on the rights of those persons 
than does the security protocol. Presumably, 
persons who avoided the security protocol by 
declaring an intention to attend the meeting on 
the second floor would have to be detained for 
the purpose of being escorted to the meeting. 
They would also be required to remain in the 
meeting room throughout, and would once 
again be detained while being escorted out of 
the building after the meeting. Those 
individuals would also be required to declare 
to the authorities the reason for attending at 
Police Headquarters, something they are not 
required to do under the present protocol.
In my view, a security protocol tailored to 
exempt individuals purporting to enter Police 
Headquarters to go to a meeting of the TPSB 
would not provide effective security for the 
building and would in all likelihood impose 
more significant limit on the rights of persons 
attending those meetings than does the existing 
security protocol.
The ability to view the TPSB proceedings on 
YouTube and to make deputations in writing 
also mitigates the limit on freedom of 
expression imposed by the screening protocol 
to some extent. [paras. 81-85]
Finally, the security protocol did not have a 
disproportionate effect  on the s. 2(b) right. “In my 
view, the protection of the safety of all persons 
entering Police Headquarters or working in Police 
Headquarters is an important objective,” said 
Justice Doherty. “The protection of persons wishing 
to attend the meetings of the  TPSB, a form of 
freedom of expression, also promotes the value 
underlying freedom of expression. Balanced 
against that important objective is a  relatively 
minor limit of [the applicant’s] s. 2(b) right.”
The security protocol initiated by the Police Chief 
was a reasonable limit on the applicant’s right to 
freedom of expression that was demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society.
The Police Chief’s appeal was allowed, the 
application judge’s order was set aside, and an 
order dismissing the application was substituted.








On December 16, 2019 the  BC Coroners Service 
has released its Pedestrian Deaths report that 
summarizes all accidental, traffic related deaths 
occurring between January 1, 2010 and November 
30, 2019. A “pedestrian” is defined as “a person 
involved in a motor vehicle  incident who, at the 
time of the incident, was on foot, sitting down, or 
lying down on a public highway or parking lot 
used by the public.” This includes skateboarders, 
longboarders, and rollerbladers.
 Highlights
• On average there were 56 pedestrian deaths 
annually between 2010-2019.
• Pedestrian deaths occurred more frequently in 
the fall and winter months. 
• 32% of all pedestrian deaths occurred in 
Vancouver, Surrey and Abbotsford.
• 58% of pedestrian deaths involved males.
• 59% of pedestrian deaths involved persons aged 
50 or over.
Pedestrian Deaths By Year & Sex
Year Deaths Female Male
2010 60 29 31
2011 57 20 37
2012 62 28 34
2013 52 24 28
2014 54 24 30
2015 65 23 42
2016 65 31 34
2017 43 19 24
2018 56 20 36
2019 (Jan-Nov) 49 18 31
Total 563 236 327
Pedestrian Deaths:Top 5 Towns








Pedestrian Deaths By Age Group
Age 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Total
0-9 3 - - 1 1 2 - 1 - - 8
10-18 4 4 6 3 6 3 8 - 3 2 39
19-29 14 9 6 6 4 8 8 9 8 5 77
30-39 4 9 3 6 4 2 6 5 10 9 58
40-49 7 1 6 4 3 10 5 4 5 4 49
50-59 3 11 7 11 11 11 8 3 5 7 77
60-69 5 9 7 6 4 7 11 3 5 9 66
70-79 14 7 17 3 12 9 6 10 7 6 91
80-89 6 5 9 11 9 10 10 7 11 7 85
90+ - 2 1 1 - 3 3 1 2 - 13
Total 60 57 62 52 54 65 65 43 56 49 563
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ASSAULTS AGAINST PEACE 
OFFICERS ON THE RISE
In September 2019 BC’s Ministry of Public Safety 
and Solicitor General Policing and Security Branch 
released Crime Trends data for 2009-2018. Data 
indicates assaults against peace officers are up from 
2017 to 2018. 
Theft Under $5,000 Most Common 
Offence
Theft under $5,000 was the most common offence 
reported to BC police  in 2018. This was followed 
by mischief, disturbing the peace, and break and 
enter.
Assaults Against Peace Officers
Year 2017 2018 Change













2018 Top Seven BC Offences
Offence Number Cleared Persons 
Charged
Theft under $5,000 120,967 13,474 6,439
Mischief 45,193 9,149 1,621
Disturbing Peace 41,848 12,716 747
Break & Enter 26,161 2,709 2,343
Assault Level 1 22,245 15,015 9,204



















Victoria 110,859 105.4 11,683 2,653 7,541 1,489 1 217
Vancouver 674,776 81.8 55,173 8,338 42,183 4,652 15 1,212
Surrey 569,389 72.9 41,530 5,953 26,166 9,411 15 2,135
Langley Township 127,954 70.4 9,011 1,092 6,146 1,773 3 565
Abbotsford 152,043 67.0 10,188 1,673 7,709 806 6 636
Kelowna 136,233 66.9 14,684 1,524 10,017 3,143 1 579
Richmond 216,300 53.7 11,622 1,525 7,977 2,120 5 348
Burnaby 248,476 52.7 13,088 1,873 10,094 1,121 2 475
Coquitlam 148,665 47.9 7,122 1,005 4,499 1,618 1 249
Delta 110,391 40.7 4,494 527 3,115 852 1 146
Saanich 122,245 38.3 4,680 940 3,343 397 1 76
** per 100,000 residents.
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 Homicides Drop
Homicides dropped by 25% 
from 2017 to 2018. In 2017 
there  were 119 homicides in 
BC while in 2018 there  were 
89.
PARENTS MORE LIKELY TO 
ENCOURAGE CHILDREN TO 
BECOME DOCTORS THAN COPS
According to a poll conducted by Research Co. on 
career paths in British Columbia, more parents 
would encourage their children to be a doctor or 
nurse than a politician, arts performer, professional 
athlete or police officer. 
RELEVANCE v. MATERIALITY
In R. v. Adan, 2019 ONCA 709, the Ontario 
Court of Appeal examined the admissibility of 
after-the-fact conduct and how it is to be 
received in court. Evidence will be admitted if it 
is “relevant, material, not contrary to any 
applicable admissibility rule and its probative 
value exceeds it prejudicial effect.” But just what 
do the terms relevant and material mean? This 
case helps explain those words.
Relevant
“Relevance has to do with the relationship 
between the item of evidence and the fact its 
proponent seeks to establish by its admission. 
Relevance is assessed in the context of the other 
evidence adduced, the case as whole, and the 
positions of counsel. Evidence is relevant if, as 
matter of everyday experience and common 
sense, it makes the fact for which it is tendered 
slightly more or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence. There are no per se or 
bright line rules.” [reference omitted, para. 66]
Material
“Materiality is a legal concept. Evidence is 
material if it is offered to prove a fact in issue, 
as determined by the allegations in the 
indictment and the law governing the 
proceedings. Material issues at a trial are those 
dealing with the essential elements of the 
offences charged, the modes of participation 
relied upon, and the defences or justifications in 
play.” [reference omitted, para. 68]
-25%
BC’s Top 10 Highest Crime Rates: 2018
Policing Jurisdiction Crime 
Rate
Population
Takla Landing Prov 385.4 205
Tsay Keh Dene Prov 324.2 586
Agassiz Prov 238.5 2,964
Quesnel Mun 233.8 10,428
Terrace Mun 226.5 12,248
Williams Lake Mun 216.9 11,359
Hope Mun 185.8 6,659
Fort St James  Prov 179.9 4,457
Prince Rupert Mun 169.8 12,821














“Definitely encourage” and 
“Probably encourage
Discourage includes 
“Definitely discourage” and 
“Probably discourage.”
Source: B C Parents Partial to Kids Pursuing 
Medicine and Engineering  [Accessed February 
15, 2020]
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IIO DETERMINES WHAT 
‘COOPERATE FULLY’ MEANS 
DURING INVESTIGATION 
Independent Investigations Office of 
BC v. Vancouver (City) Police Department, 
2020 BCCA 4
When several pol ice of f icers 
responded to a robbery, one of them 
fatally shot a man. The Independent 
I n v e s t i g a t i o n s O f f i c e ( I I O ) 
investigated the matter. The IIO is a 
civilian-lead oversight agency responsible for 
conducting investigations into police actions 
resulting in death or serious bodily harm. The IIO 
directed several police “witness officers” to attend 
for compulsory interviews. These officers were 
witnesses to the incident and were not being 
investigated for their potential role in causing the 
death, unlike “subject officers”.
Prior to the  interviews, lawyers for the witness 
officers asked the IIO for pre-interview disclosure. 
The o f f i c e r s wan ted acce s s t o va r i ou s 
contemporaneous records of the event such as 
computer assisted dispatch (CAD) entries that the 
officer made or was able to see during the incident; 
audio recordings or transcripts that the officer made 
or was able to hear during the  incident; and video 
of the incident that showed events that the officer 
participated in or observed during  the incident. The 
IIO refused to provide the requested disclosure, but 
was prepared to provide some limited materials on 
the day of the interview. As a result, the officers 
declined to be interviewed. 
British Columbia Supreme Court
The IIO petitioned for a  mandamus 
order compelling the witness officers to 
attend the IIO interviews without the 
pre-interview disclosure they requested. 
The IIO submitted that the duty to cooperate found 
in s. 38.101 of B.C.’s Police Act (PA) did not confer 
discretion on the witness officers to determine the 
BY THE BOOK:
BC’s Police Act
Officers to cooperate with 
independent investigations 
office
s. 38.101 An officer must cooperate fully 
with
(a) the chief civilian director in the chief civilian 
director’s exercise of powers or performance of 
duties under this Act, and
(b) an IIO investigator in the IIO investigator’s 
exercise of powers or performance of duties under 
this Act.
CRIME STOPPERS RELEASES 
2019 STATS
According to the Canadian Crime Stoppers 
Association, as of December 31, 2019 the 
program has resulted in the following:
๏ 198,570 arrests.
๏ 271,915 cases cleared.
๏ $15,411,520 in rewards paid.
๏ $545,249,691 in property recovered.
๏ $3,606,954,967 in drugs seized.
As at October 1, 2019, the 
Ontario Association of 
Crime Stoppers reported 
t h a t i t s p r o v i n c e 
accumulated the following 
statistics in relation to its 
programs:
๏ 125,485 arrests.
๏ 133,687 cleared cases.
๏ $8,216,592 in rewards paid.
๏ $307,293,201 in property recovered.
๏ $1,928,888,072 in drugs seized.
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terms of their cooperation. On the other hand, the 
witness officers contended that s.  38.101 did not 
empower the IIO to unilaterally impose interview 
terms related to disclosure that were not acceptable 
to witness officers. 
The judge concluded that the IIO determines what 
“cooperate fully” means, not witness officers. 
First, a 2012 memorandum of understanding 
between the IIO and all BC police agencies was not 
legislative authority and therefore did not assist in 
interpreting the obligations on witness officers to 
“cooperate fully” with the IIO. Second, witness 
officers have an obligation to cooperate fully  with 
an investigation and do not have discretion to 
determine the bounds of the  interview process. At 
common law, police officers have the duty to assist 
in law enforcement and, as members of a self-
governing profession, to cooperate with their 
governing bodies. The purpose of the legislative 
scheme was to “provide an independent and 
transparent investigative body for the purpose of 
maintaining public confidence in the police and 
the justice  system along with the  minimum 
procedural requirements expected at the 
investigation stage.”
The judge granted the order requiring  the officers 
attend the interviews and respond in good faith to 
questions put to them by the IIO. In addition, the 
judge made the following declarations:
• The duty on witness officers to fully co-operate 
with the IIO includes the duty to attend 
interviews related to IIO investigations as and 
when the IIO directs;
• Attendance of witness officers’ counsel and 
union representatives at IIO interviews is at 
the discretion of the IIO;
• The providing of pre-interview disclosure  to 
witness officers is at the discretion of the IIO; 
and
• The witness officers failed or refused to 
comply with their statutory duty to co-operate 
fully with the IIO.
The witness officers complied with the judge’s 
order and attended the interviews. Following the 
IIO investigation, no charges were filed against any 
officer.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The witness officers sought to 
quash the Supreme Court 
judge’s declarations. They 
argued that the legislature did 
not intend to give the IIO the unilateral power to 
determine the content of the duty to cooperate fully 
in an investigation. They suggested, among other 
things, that withholding the pre-interview 
disclosure they requested was i l logical , 
unsupported by evidence and arbitrary. They 
wanted the  sought materials to ensure that the 
information they would provide in the interview 
was the  most accurate  reflection of what happened 
as they witnessed it, untarnished by misperception 
or faulty recollection. The contemporaneous 
recording of each particular officer’s participation 
in the event would best fulfil the investigation’s 
truth-seeking function, avoid potential factual error 
and promote a scheme of investigation best able  to 
ensure a transparent investigation capable  of 
maintaining public confidence. In the officers’ 
view, the duty to cooperate was not a duty to 
submit to arbitrary terms imposed by the IlO.
“The plain terms of the statute impose the duty to cooperate on police officers. 
The duty is owed to IlO investigators. It is a duty to cooperate fully with those 
investigators. It is expressed as a mandatory, not a qualified, duty. Nothing in the 
wording of the statute supports the inference that police officers can withhold 
their cooperation with the investigation, if they disagree with the terms on which 
it is being conducted.”
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The Duty To “Cooperate Fully”
In interpreting the statutory duty  to cooperate fully 
with an investigation under s. 38.101, Justice 
Harris, delivering the  Court of Appeal’s decision, 
found it was the IIO that decides what is required. 
He stated:
The plain terms of the statute impose the duty 
to cooperate on police officers. The duty is 
owed to IlO investigators. It is a duty to 
cooperate fully with those investigators. It is 
expressed as a mandatory, not a qualified, duty. 
Nothing in the wording of the statute supports 
the inference that police officers can withhold 
their cooperation with the investigation, if they 
disagree with the terms on which it is being 
conducted. ...
It is clear that the exercise of a statutory power 
must be exercised in a manner consistent with 
and to further the purposes of the statute. While 
the power to define the cooperation required of 
police officers in an investigation cannot be 
exercised for a purpose collateral to the 
statutory objective, I can see nothing in the 
record before us that could support the 
inference that the demands made by the IlO 
were arbitrary or capricious. Rather, the conflict 
between the parties reflects a disagreement 
about the best, most reasonable, or most 
efficient means of investigating this particular 
incident. Should demands be made, in other 
circumstances that are properly viewed as 
arbitrary because they are inconsistent with the 
objectives of the legislation, a remedy would 
lie.
In my opinion, the broad and general definition 
of the duty to cooperate fully in s. 38.101, by 
contrast with the more prescriptive and specific 
articulation of the duty to cooperate elsewhere 
in the PA and other legislation, does not 
support an inference that the legislature 
intended that the scope and content of the duty 
to cooperate would be resolved by discussion 
among interested parties and perhaps included 
in a memorandum of understanding. To the 
contrary, the broad definition discloses a 
legislative intention to confer on the IlO a 
broad power to determine the terms on which 
an investigation will be conducted and to 
define what is required of police officers in 
discharging their duty to cooperate fully with 
an investigation as part of civilian oversight of 
investigations into police conduct. [paras. 
16-18]
And further:
This interpretation is consistent with the objects 
of the legislative scheme. The purpose of the 
scheme is to ensure civilian oversight of 
investigations into police conduct causing 
death or serious personal injury. The 
mechanism to achieve this is the IIO. The IIO is 
a product of, and a response to, public 
inquiries into alleged police misconduct ... It is 
common ground that an important objective of 
an independent and transparent investigative 
body is the maintenance of public confidence 
in the police and the justice system as a whole. 
[para. 20]
“The officers’ public legal duty to cooperate fully 
with the IIO is part of a legislative scheme that is 
intended to provide an independent and 
transparent investigative body for the purpose of 
maintaining public confidence in the police and 
the justice system, and that only minimal 
procedural requirements can be expected at the 
investigation stage,” said Justice Harris agreeing 
with the lower court. “I also agree that witness 
officers fail to comply with their duty to cooperate 
by demanding certain conditions — such as pre-
“[W]itness officers fail to comply with their duty to cooperate by demanding 
certain conditions — such as pre-interview disclosure, the presence of counsel, 
the presence of union representatives, assurances that there will be no derivative 
use of their accounts, and that the interview be scheduled to accommodate 
annual leave, weekly leave, particular shifts or on some other basis — as a pre-
condition to their cooperation.” 
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interview disclosure, the presence of counsel, the 
presence of union representatives, assurances that 
there will be no derivative use of their accounts, 
and that the interview be scheduled to 
accommodate annual leave, weekly leave, 
particular shifts or on some other basis — as a pre-
condition to their cooperation.” 
The officers’ appeal was dismissed and the 
declarations were not quashed. 
Editor’s Note: The Court of Appeal recognized that 
the officers’ request for disclosure was made in 
good faith and was intended to be consistent with 
their duty to fully cooperate with the investigation, 
not frustrate it. 
It was the decision of the IIO’s Chief Civilian 
Director to not forward charges to BC’s Prosecution 
Service on this shooting event. 
MORE ABOUT THE IIO
In its Annual Report 2018/19, the IIO describes 
itself as follows:
The IIO has jurisdiction over all of B.C.’s 
policing agencies, including 11 municipal 
agencies, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(rcmp), the South Coast BC Transportation 
Authority Police Service and the Stl’atl’imx 
Tribal Police Service. The organization’s 
jurisdiction extends to officers appointed as 
special provincial constables, municipal 
constables, and includes on- and off-duty 
police officers. The IIO’s authority comes from 
the British Columbia Police Act, which requires 
the police to notify the IIO of an incident that 
may fall within its jurisdiction. 
Th e I I O u n d e r t a k e s p u b l i c i n t e r e s t 
investigations and conducts them to a criminal 
law standard. The investigations commence 
based on the fact that there has been serious 
harm or death. There does not need to be an 
allegation of wrongdoing. All investigations are 
carried out in as transparent a manner as is 
practical under the circumstances, while 
respecting the integrity of the investigation and 
the privacy interests of those involved. [p. 5]
According to the IIO’s Annual Report, the IIO 
received 177 notifications of incidents that 
potentially  involved serious harm or death arising 
from the action or inaction of police for the fiscal 
period from April 1, 2018 to March 31, 2019. Of 
those notifications, 50 were categorized as advice 
files while  127 were investigated. Of the 127 
investigations, 66 files were closed and no public 
report was released, 32 files were closed with a 
public report released, three (3) files were referred 
to Crown Counsel and 26 files remained under 
investigation. Of the  101 closed investigations, 55 
originated from an RCMP detachment, 43 from a 
municipal police department, two (2) from a Tribal 
Police Service and one (1) was reported by a 
conservation officer. 
Of the 127 investigations, 99  notifications to the 
IIO occurred within 24 hours of the incident taking 
place. Of these notifications, 19% were made 
within one hour of the incident while the average 
reporting time was five hours and 11 minutes. The 
remaining 28 notifications occurred after 24 hours. 
AFFECTED PERSONS 
Individuals who died or suffered serious injuries as a result of an interaction with BC police.
Ages 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75-84 Total
Male 17 30 23 15 14 3 1 103
Female 5 10 2 3 3 1 0 24
Total 22 40 25 18 17 4 1 127





Abbotsford 6 2 - - 1 - 1 4 - - - 2 - 1 1 -
Delta 1 1 - - 1 - - 0 - - - - - - - -
Nelson 1 0 - - - - - 1 - 1 - - - - - -
New Westminster 2 1 - - 1 - - 1 - - - - - - - 1
Central Saanich 1 1 - - 1 - - 0 - - - - - - - -
Saanich 3 0 - - - - - 3 - - - 2 - - 1 -
Vancouver 32 2 - 1 1 - - 30 - 3 1 6 - 4 11 5
Victoria 5 2 - - 1 1 - 3 - - 1 1 - - 1 -
West Vancouver 2 1 - - 1 - - 1 - - - 1 - - - -
Municipal Total 53 10 0 1 7 1 1 43 0 4 2 12 0 5 14 6
RCMP 71 26 5 4 7 3 7 45 2 7 3 5 1 4 15 8
Tribal Police 2 1 - - 1 - - 1 - - - - - - 1 -
Other (Conservation) 1 0 - - - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - -
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24-HOUR DRIVING 
PROHIBITION CAN BE SERVED 
OTHER THAN AT ROADSIDE
Evans v. New Westminster (Police Department), 
2019 BCCA 317
A police officer was dispatched to a 
motor vehicle accident. The caller, 
who had been stopped at a  red light, 
pointed to a  vehicle stating its driver 
had rear-ended him. This driver was 
seated in his vehicle. When police spoke with him, 
an officer noted he had slurred speech, scattered 
thoughts and difficulty with balance. The driver said 
he had drug paraphernalia in his pocket. The 
paraphernalia was removed, including a used 
needle, metal tin, and a damp cotton ball. 
The driver was detained for an impaired driving 
investigation and he was subjected to a 
Standardized Field Sobriety Test (SFST). On the 
basis of the  test results and possession of drug 
paraphernalia, police concluded that the driver was 
impaired by drugs. A demand for a drug influence 
evaluation was made and the driver was 
transported to the police station for further testing 
by a Drug Recognition Expert (DRE). The driver 
contacted counsel before the additional test. He 
was subsequently served with a 24-hour notice of 
driving prohibition under to s. 215(3) of BC’s Motor 
Vehicle Act.
British Columbia Supreme Court
On petition for judicial review of the 
officer’s decision to impose the 
prohibition, the  judge quashed it. She 
applied a strict interpretation of the 
statute and accepted the driver’s position that the 
notice of 24-hour prohibition had to be issued 
roadside (on a highway or industrial road); it could 
not be issued at the police station. In her view, the 
officer had “no express or implied authority to 
issue the prohibition anywhere but the roadside”, 
and therefore the notice was improperly issued. 
Since the purpose of s.  215(3) is “to provide a 
rapid response to someone who is driving while 
impaired”, it was not reasonable for the officer to 
have interpreted the section expansively  to allow 
for service at the police station.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
BC’s Attorney General argued, 
among other things, that the 
of f icer ’s interpretat ion of 
s. 215(3)(b) was reasonable. The 
driver disagreed. The driver also submitted that, 
even if the officer’s interpretation of s. 215(3)(b) was 
not unreasonable, the officer did not have 
reasonable grounds to believe that his ability to 
drive was affected by a drug other than alcohol.
s. 215(3)(b) of the MVA
After identifying and applying the  correct standard 
of review (reasonableness), along with the modern 
approach to statutory interpretation, the Court of 
Appeal found the  police officer’s interpretation of s. 
215(3)(b) over a strict reading of its text would 
BY THE BOOK:
BC’s Motor Vehicle Act
24-Hour Driving Prohibition
s. 215 (3) A peace officer may, at any 
time or place on a highway or industrial 
road if the peace officer has reasonable 
grounds to believe that a driver's ability 
to drive a motor vehicle is affected by a drug, other 
than alcohol,
(a) request the driver to drive the motor vehicle, 
under the direction of the peace officer, to the 
nearest place off the travelled portion of the 
highway or industrial road,
(b) serve the driver with a notice of driving 
prohibition, and
(c) if the driver is in possession of a driver's licence, 
request the driver to surrender that licence. this 
Act.
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allow service of the 24-hour notice of prohibition at 
the police station. Such a  flexible interpretation was 
within the range of reasonable possibilities 
considering the provision’s purpose, its context and 
its consequences. “Allowing a peace officer to 
serve a  notice of 24-hour driving prohibition at the 
police detachment furthers the purpose of 
s.  215(3)(b), allows peace officers’ duties under 
the MVA and the Criminal Code to dovetail, and 
avoids absurd consequences,”  said Justice  Bennett. 
“In giving [the driver] a 24-hour driving 
prohibition at the police detachment, [the officer] 
implicitly decided that he had the authority to do 
so.” She continued:  
I take [the officer’s] interpretation to be that a 
notice can be served in the police station as 
long as there is a sufficiently strong connection 
to impaired driving on a highway or industrial 
road. ... I consider that interpretation to be 
within the range of defensible and acceptable 
outcomes. [para. 26]
And further:
The purpose of s. 215(3)(b) is to ensure a driver 
does not drive any vehicle when there is a risk 
that their ability to operate a vehicle may still 
be affected by drugs. This includes driving a 
vehicle once the driver has left the roadside, as 
a driver can always return to the road upon 
release. A restrictive understanding of where 
the notice must be served would unduly fetter 
officers’ ability to fulfil that purpose. It was 
reasonable for [the officer] to arrive at an 
interpretation that instead allowed him to 
manage the ongoing risk of [the driver] driving 
while impaired, a risk that did not end once he 
was removed from the road.
[...]
In serving [the driver] with a notice at the 
police station, [the officer] implicitly endorsed 
the integration of the MVA and Criminal Code 
impaired-driving regimes. The MVA and 
Criminal Code are an “interlocking scheme of 
federal and provincial legislation” aimed at 
controlling impaired driving. Whereas 
provincial legislation can lead to administrative 
consequences directed at minimizing the threat 
of an impaired driver, federal legislation can 
punish the impaired driver if their conduct rose 
to the level of criminality. [references omitted, 
paras. 32-34]
Justice Bennett also provided the following 
examples as absurd results if service of a 24-hour 
prohibition was only permitted roadside:
• An officer directs an impaired driver to drive 
their motor vehicle completely off of the 
highway because there is no safe place to stop 
on the highway.
• An impaired driver flees and pulls into a  private 
driveway.
• An impaired driver is taken to a  hospital before 
the officer can complete the necessary 
paperwork. 
• Restricting service to the roadside would require 
the police to serve a notice on a person who is 
too impaired to understand its meaning.
Reasonable Grounds
The Court of Appeal also rejected the driver’s 
contention that there  were insufficient grounds to 
believe that his ability  to drive was affected by a 
drug other than alcohol. Justice Bennett found the 
officer “had ample evidence of drug-induced 
intoxication and would have easily formed 
reasonable grounds that [the driver’s] ability to 
drive  was affected by a drug other than alcohol.” 
She stated:
Subsection 215(3) requires the officer to 
consider whether there is a credibly based 
probability that a driver’s ability to drive is 
“Allowing a peace officer to serve a notice of 24-hour driving prohibition at the 
police detachment furthers the purpose of s. 215(3)(b), allows peace officers’ 
duties under the MVA and the Criminal Code to dovetail, and avoids absurd 
consequences. In giving [the driver] a 24-hour driving prohibition at the police 
detachment, [the officer] implicitly decided that he had the authority to do so.” 
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affected by a drug other than alcohol. Assessing 
reasonable grounds is a matter of considering 
the totality of the circumstances. The 
information must be examined as a whole on a 
“practical, non-technical, and common sense 
basis”.
[The officer] and his partner arrived on the 
scene on the basis of a complaint that [the 
driver] had rear-ended another driver while 
appearing intoxicated. Upon arrival, [the 
officer] observed signs of impairment and [the 
driver] freely admitted to possession of drug 
paraphernalia, including a still-moist cotton 
ball. [Another officer] then carried out a 
standard field sobriety test and concluded that 
[the driver] was impaired. It is difficult to 
conceive of stronger evidence of drug 
impairment that could be found during a 
simple roadside interaction.
Although the officers’ notes do not say that they 
specifically considered whether [the driver] was 
impaired by alcohol, they did not need to do so 
in this case. As a matter of common sense, 
when peace officers arrive on the scene of a 
collision and find an intoxicated individual 
with drug paraphernalia, including a still-moist 
cotton ball, in his pocket, they will be justified 
in concluding that they have reasonable 
grounds to believe that the individual is 
intoxicated by a drug other than alcohol. 
[references omitted, paras. 40-42]
The Attorney General’s appeal was allowed and the 
24-hour driving prohibition was reinstated. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
EXTREMELY SERIOUS POLICE 
MISCONDUCT RESULTS IN 
EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE
R. v. Mohammed, 2020 ONCA 9
Police stopped the accused’s car in 
the parking lot of a closed Liquor 
Control Board of Ontario (LCBO) 
store because its licence plate light 
was out. An officer approached the 
car and noticed smoke that smelled like marihuana 
coming from it. The accused was arrested and given 
a “soft caution” - an informal caution that did not 
advise of the  availability of legal aid or of access to 
duty  counsel. The accused was then patted down 
but nothing was found. 
The accused was then strip searched in the parking 
lot. An officer looked down the accused’s boxer 
shorts and saw what he thought was the butt or the 
magazine  of a  gun. The accused’s pants were then 
unzipped and dropped to his ankles, but no gun 
was found. Following this search, the accused was 
placed in the rear seat of the police car. The 
accused’s car was then searched and a  debt list, 
cash, a grinder, and several cellphones near the 
driver’s seat were found. Police  also located two 
ziplocked bags of marijuana, a scale, and 
ammunition in a backpack on the rear seat.  
An officer then questioned the accused about 
whether he had a gun. The officer told the accused 
that if he turned over what he had in his pants, he 
would be released. The accused admitted he had a 
loaded gun, and he was asked to retrieve it. When 
he could not do so, the officer used a knife to cut 
the gun from the accused’s pant leg. The accused 
was arrested and cautioned after the gun was 
found. He was then strip searched again at the 
police station. The accused’s cellphone was also 
searched without a warrant. Old messages were 
reviewed and photographs of messages considered 
relevant to drug trafficking were taken. He was 
charged with several firearm offences, possessing 
property obtained by crime and possessing 
cannabis for the purpose of trafficking.
“As a matter of common sense, when 
peace officers arrive on the scene of 
a collision and find an intoxicated 
individual with drug paraphernalia, 
including a still-moist cotton ball, in 
his pocket, they will be justified in 
concluding that they have 
reasonable grounds to believe that 
the individual is intoxicated by a 
drug other than alcohol.”
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Ontario Court of Justice
The judge admitted the  evidence 
obtained during the accused’s roadside 
strip search, his interrogation without 
counsel, the search of his vehicle and the 
search of his cellphone under s. 24(2). The accused 
was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon; 
unauthorized possession of a firearm; unauthorized 
possession of a firearm in a  motor vehicle; 
possession of a prohibited or restricted firearm with 
ammunition without a license; possession of 
property obtained by crime; and possession for the 
purpose of trafficking. The trial judge considered 
the strip search “degrading and unjustified” and 
reduced the length of the accused’s sentence by 
100 days as a result.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The Crown conceded that the 
seizures of the handgun and 
marijuana were temporally and 
contextual ly connected to 
Charter  breaches under ss. 7, 8, and 10(b) 
including:
• The police failure to formally caution the 
accused following his arrest;
• The police failure to advise the accused of the 
availability of legal aid or duty counsel;
• Questioning the accused for over twenty 
minutes before he could consult with counsel;
• Strip searching the accused; and
• Searching the accused’s cellphone without a 
warrant.
The Crown also conceded that the trial judge erred 
in his s. 24(2) analysis by not considering  all of the 
Charter breaches that occurred and in failing to 
apply the proper analysis. In the  Crown’s view, the 
text messages retrieved from the cellphone search 
should have been excluded from the trial. But the 
Crown suggested that the gun and marihuana were 
admissible. The gun would have been inevitably 
found since, once the bullets were found in the car, 
the accused would have been lawfully searched. 
And the evidence obtained from the search of the 
car was admissible since it was lawfully conducted. 
The Court of Appeal disagreed. Even though the 
search of the car was lawful, each Charter breach 
was “very serious” and cumulatively  they were 
egregious: 
The first strip search was plainly not authorized 
by law. It is clear ... that a lawful arrest does not 
automatically confer the authority to strip 
search someone, even incident to the arrest. 
[The officer’s] actions must be understood in 
this light. He wrongly believed that he could 
strip search every male he arrested for any kind 
of drug offence routinely, despite s. 8 of the 
Cha r t e r — a f ac to r tha t t he C rown 
acknowledges exacerbates the serious nature of 
the breach. To make matters worse, the strip 
search was conducted in public, and in a 
highly invasive manner. 
The [accused] was questioned by the police for 
20 minutes without being provided the right to 
counsel. This involved informational and 
implementational breaches of the right to 
counsel. The [accused] was not told of his right 
without delay and was not given a chance to 
exercise it. He was induced to incriminate 
himself and admitted to having a gun in his 
pants as a result. The police persuaded the 
[accused] to turn over the gun on the false 
promise that he would be released. These were 
serious breaches of the [accused’s] s. 7 and 
10(b) Charter rights. 
“The first strip search was plainly not authorized by law.  It is clear ... that a 
lawful arrest does not automatically confer the authority to strip search 
someone, even incident to the arrest. ... [The officer] wrongly believed that he 
could strip search every male he arrested for any kind of drug offence routinely, 
despite s. 8 of the Charter ... . To make matters worse, the strip search was 
conducted in public, and in a highly invasive manner.”
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The warrantless search of the [accused’s] 
cellphone involved the police reviewing the 
[accused’s] incoming and saved messages and 
photographing eight messages that were used 
as evidence of drug trafficking. This search was 
in violation of s. 8 of the Charter, as made clear 
by the Supreme Court in R. v. Fearon ... with 
which the police should have been familiar. 
[reference omitted, paras. 16-18]
As for the impact of the Charter breaches on the 
accused’s protected interests, it was significant both 
as individual breaches and in sum:
... The strip search was conducted in public and 
was highly invasive. Among other things, [the 
officer] looked down into the [accused’s] 
shorts. ... The delay in providing the [accused] 
with his right to counsel seriously undermined 
the [accused’s] right to silence and resulted in 
him providing incriminating evidence. The 
search of the [accused’s] cellphone was a 
significant intrusion into his privacy.
In summary, this was not a case of a simple 
mistake that resulted in evidence being 
discovered. This was a series of serious rights 
violations, committed in apparent ignorance of 
well-established law, arising out of the 
[accused’s] arrest for smoking a marijuana 
joint. These violations had a significant impact 
on the [accused’s] Charter-protected interests. 
[para. 20-21]
Despite the  strong public interest in adjudicating 
this case  involving drug trafficking and serious 
firearms offences, as well as the  cogency and 
reliability of the evidence, the seriousness of the 
Charter breaches and their significant impact on 
the accused resulted in the exclusion of the 
evidence: 
The police misconduct was extremely serious. 
It involved the significant violation of not one 
but several constitutional rights, all governed by 
well-established caselaw. Admitting the 
evidence connected to these breaches would 
bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute in the long term, despite the 
lawfulness of the search of the [accused’s] car 
and its connection to evidence that might have 
been discovered lawfully in any event. [para. 
22]
The accused’s appeal was allowed, his convictions 
were set aside and verdicts of acquittal were 
entered.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
TELLING TRUTH IN RESPONSE 
TO SPONTANEOUS QUESTION 
DID NOT ELICIT STATEMENT
R. v. Gignac, 2020 ONCA 42
The accused was arrested by police 
at 3:01 a.m. and indicated he did not 
wish to give a statement until after he 
had consulted counsel. The arresting 
officer continued to read from a pre-
printed card and asked the accused twice whether 
he wished to make a statement. The accused 
indicated that he did not. He was handcuffed and 
placed in a  vehicle to await transport to the police 
station. 
Shortly after, the accused asked the arresting officer 
whether his wife  was going to be arrested. The 
arresting officer told the  accused that “there [was] 
a search warrant being executed...at his home” 
and that he “couldn’t really give an answer as to 
whether or not [the accused’s] wife was actually 
going to be arrested”. The accused then said there 
was a safe in the living room of his home, the  safe 
had cocaine in it, and the cocaine was his. The 
accused also provided the combination to the 
living room safe. When police searched the safe 
they found drugs, including cocaine and fentanyl 
patches.
“The police misconduct was extremely serious. It involved the significant 
violation of not one but several constitutional rights, all governed by well-
established caselaw. Admitting the evidence connected to these breaches would 
bring the administration of justice into disrepute in the long term ... .”
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Ontario Court of Justice
The accused brought a  Charter motion 
seeking the exclusion of evidence under 
s. 24(2). In his view, the police breached 
his Charter  right to counsel under s. 
10(b). The judge found the accused was not a 
credible  witness and dismissed his application for 
exclusion. The judge did not, however, determine 
whether the police testimony by itself could 
establish a  Charter violation and result in the 
exclusion of the evidence. The accused was 
subsequently convicted of drug offences related to 
drugs found in the safe.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the trial 
judge erred in failing to exclude 
the statement he made shortly 
after his arrest because police 
breached his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel. He 
contended that his rights were breached because 
the arresting officer asked twice whether he  wanted 
to make a statement, even though he  said he 
wanted to speak to counsel and the officer’s 
response to his question about his wife amounted 
to an elicitation of a statement.
The Crown admitted that the arresting officer 
breached s. 10(b) by twice asking  the accused 
whether he wished to make a statement after the 
accused indicated he  wished to consult counsel. 
The Crown also conceded that there was a 
temporal connection between these breaches and 
the accused’s statement such that s. 24(2) was 
engaged. However, the Crown submitted that the 
officer’s truthful response to the accused’s 
spontaneous question was not an elicitation of a 
statement from him. In the Crown’s view, the 
accused’s statement ought to have been admitted 
for the following reasons:
• The individual good faith of the officer who read 
the rights to counsel and posed the questions 
from a pre-printed card did so some two years 
before the Supreme Court of Canada decision in 
R. v. G.T.D., 2019 SCC 7 ruled on this issue;
• The was an absence of any  causal connection 
between the Charter violations and the 
incriminatory statements made;
• The violations’ had a negligible effect on the 
accused’s Charter protected interests;
• The evidence was reliable; and
• Their was a strong societal interest in a trial on 
the merits.
The Ontario Court of Appeal described the 
circumstances of the accused’s giving of his 
statement as follows:
The [accused] spontaneously asked police if his 
wife was going to be arrested. The officer 
answered truthfully that a search warrant was 
then being executed at the [accused’s] home 
and that the officer did not know whether the 
[accused’s] wife was to be arrested. This truthful 
answer cannot be construed as an attempt by 
the officer to elicit evidence from the 
[accused]. The officer’s answer to the 
[accused’s] question did not therefore violate 
the [accused’s] s. 10(b) Charter rights. 
Nevertheless, the  Court of Appeal found that the 
Crown’s concessions regarding the Charter 
breaches, and their temporal connection to the 
accused’s incriminatory statements, triggered s. 
24(2). However, the Court of Appeal refused to 
exclude the  evidence, finding its admission would 
not bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute: 
Seriousness of the Charter infringing conduct
There is no real dispute that the arresting officer 
acted in good faith. We acknowledge that the 
“The [accused] spontaneously asked police if his wife was going to be arrested. 
The officer answered truthfully that a search warrant was then being executed 
at the [accused’s] home and that the officer did not know whether the [accused’s] 
wife was to be arrested. This truthful answer cannot be construed as an attempt 
by the officer to elicit evidence from the [accused].”
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officer’s pre-printed card, which indicated what 
was to be read to an arrested person, raises 
concerns about systemic failures to protect 
Charter rights. However, as the Alberta Court of 
Appeal noted, there was a degree of legal 
uncertainty on this issue that tempered the 
seriousness of the breach. Although G.T.D. was 
based on long established Supreme Court of 
Canada jurisprudence, the decision only 
brought clarification some two years after the 
arrest in this case.
Impact on the [accused’s] Charter protected 
interests
The police must hold off from attempts to elicit 
evidence from an accused until he or she has 
had a reasonable opportunity to consult 
counsel. This case is different from G.T.D., in 
which the accused made incriminatory 
statements in response to the questions posed 
from the flawed standard caution.
Here, there was no causal connection between 
the Charter violations and the [accused’s] 
incriminatory statements. The [accused] clearly 
understood that he did not have to speak to 
police and asserted his right to consult counsel. 
He refused to make any statement after 
asserting his wish to speak to counsel, despite 
the two questions about whether he wished to 
make a statement after that assertion. The 
breaches up to that point had no impact on his 
Charter protected interests.
Societal interest in a trial on the merits
There is no doubt the statement was voluntary. 
It was reliable evidence. The combination 
opened the living room safe in which the drugs 
were found. The statement was strong evidence 
of the [accused’s] knowledge of the contents of 
the safe and control of those contents. Twelve 
75 microgram per hour Fentanyl patches, as 
well as cocaine and other drugs, were in the 
safe. This court has reiterated the dangers that 
Fentanyl poses to the community on several 
occasions. [references omitted, paras. 13-16]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
DRE DEMAND DID NOT 
TRIGGER THE RIGHT TO 
RE-CONSULT COUNSEL
R. v. Tahmasebi, 2020 ONCA 47
After the accused drove his car onto 
a stranger’s driveway, stopped and 
remained in the car, the homeowner 
called police. Two police officers 
responded to the scene. One of the 
officers, who stopped behind the accused’s car, 
knocked on the driver’s side window several times. 
The accused rolled it down. He appeared to be 
confused and drowsy. When asked where he was 
going, the accused answered that he lived close by 
and was just taking a nap. As the officer returned to 
his cruiser intending to turn on its video camera to 
do an impaired driving investigation, the accused’s 
car rolled backwards and pinned the officer against 
his cruiser. The officer was injured.  
The accused was arrested for dangerous driving 
causing bodily harm. He was placed in the back of 
a police cruiser and read his rights, including his 
right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter. The 
accused said he understood his rights, asked to 
speak to a lawyer and explained in his own words 
the meaning of the caution he had received. The 
accused was transported to the police station where 
he told a Staff Sergeant that he was taking an opioid 
analgesic. The accused was arrested for impaired 
driving causing bodily harm and re-read his rights 
to counsel. Police called duty counsel and told the 
lawyer that the accused faced dangerous driving 
and impaired driving charges. The accused spoke to 
duty counsel for about eight (8) minutes.
A drug recognition expert (DRE) officer spoke to the 
accused, made a drug evaluation demand, and the 
accused said he  understood it. The DRE Officer 
then asked the accused if he had spoken to 
counsel. He initially replied no but when told he 
had been seen on the phone speaking to duty 
counsel responded, “[o]h, that was a lawyer?” He 
then confirmed speaking to duty counsel. The DRE 
proceeded to conduct the drug evaluation. 
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After the DRE determined that the accused’s ability 
to drive was impaired by drugs, a urine sample was 
demanded. The DRE explained the demand to the 
accused and warned him that failure to provide a 
urine sample would result in another charge. The 
accused asked to speak to a lawyer again, but the 
DRE responded that the accused had already 
spoken to a lawyer who had been advised of the 
charges and police  were not required to provide 
another consultation with counsel. The accused 
refused to comply with the demand and he was 
also then charged with refusing to provide a urine 
sample when he knew or ought to have known that 
his operation of a  motor vehicle caused an accident 
that resulted in bodily harm to another person.
Ontario Court of Justice
The accused argued, among other 
things, that his right to counsel under s. 
10(b) of the  Charter had been violated. 
He said that he had not understood his 
rights when they were read to him. Furthermore, he 
contended that he was entitled to a  further 
consultation with counsel when the DRE made a 
demand for a urine sample.
The judge, however, rejected both of these 
submissions. First, the judge found the accused’s 
own words at the roadside demonstrated he 
understood his right to counsel at all times and his 
right to remain silent. Second, the judge concluded 
that the demand for a urine sample did not give rise 
to a right for a further consultation with a lawyer.
The accused was found guilty of impaired driving 
(by  drugs) causing bodily harm and refusing  to 
comply with a demand to provide a urine sample 
simpliciter. The judge was not convinced that the 
accused knew or ought to have known the officer 
had suffered bodily harm at the time he  refused to 
provide the urine sample. The accused was 
sentenced to 90 days in jail and prohibited from 
driving for two (2) years. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused revived his s. 10(b) 
argument that his right to 
counsel was breached because 
he was denied the opportunity 
to re-consult counsel. This time he suggested the 
right to re-consult was triggered when the DRE 
demand was made rather than just when the 
demand for the urine sample was made. 
Right to Re-Consult Counsel
Justice Zarnett, authoring the  Court of Appeal’s 
unanimous decision, described the purpose of s. 
10(b) and when a second consultation with counsel 
arises:
 
Section 10(b) of the Charter states that upon 
arrest or detention, everyone has the right to 
“retain and instruct counsel without delay and 
to be informed of that right”. Its purpose is “to 
support the detainee’s right to choose whether 
to cooperate with the police investigation or 
not, by giving him access to legal advice on the 
situation he is facing. This is achieved by 
requiring that he be informed of the right to 
consult counsel and, if he so requests, be given 
an opportunity to consult counsel”.
While “normally, s. 10(b) affords the detainee a 
single consultation with a lawyer…in some 
circumstances, a further opportunity to consult 
a lawyer may be constitutionally required”. A 
“Section 10(b) of the Charter states that upon arrest or detention, everyone has 
the right to ‘retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that 
right’. Its purpose is ‘to support the detainee’s right to choose whether to 
cooperate with the police investigation or not, by giving him access to legal 
advice on the situation he is facing. This is achieved by requiring that he be 
informed of the right to consult counsel and, if he so requests, be given an 
opportunity to consult counsel’.”
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request to re-consult with counsel is not in 
itself sufficient. “What is required is a change in 
circumstances that suggests that the choice 
faced by the accused has been significantly 
altered, requiring further advice on the new 
situation, in order to fulfill the purpose of s. 
10(b) of providing the accused with legal 
advice relevant to the choice of whether to 
cooperate with the police investigation or not”. 
[references omitted, paras. 19-20]
The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized at 
least three  (3) situations in which a  second 
consultation with counsel would be constitutionally 
required because a further opportunity to consult is 
necessary to fulfill the purpose of s. 10(b):
1. New Non-Routine Procedures: When new 
non-routine procedures (such as participating 
in a line-up or submitting to a polygraph) are 
proposed by the police that do not generally 
fall within the expectation of the advising 
lawyer at the time of the initial consultation, 
an opportunity  to consult counsel again must 
be provided. This category did not apply in 
this case, however, “because what occurred 
after the [accused] was charged with 
impaired driving causing bodily harm and had 
his initial consultation with duty counsel — 
namely the DRE demand and, based on the 
result of the drug evaluation, the urine 
sample demand – were procedures that were 
‘within the expectation of the advising lawyer 
at the time of the initial consultation’,” said 
Justice Zarnett. “The procedures would be 
within the expectation of a  lawyer advising a 
person charged with impairing driving.” He 
continued:
The statutory relationship between the 
procedures of a DRE demand and a urine 
sample demand on the one hand, and the 
offence of impaired driving on the other, 
does not permit the conclusion that the 
procedures fall outside the expectation of a 
lawyer advising a person who has been 
arrested or detained on a charge of impaired 
driving. That such demands might be made, 
and their consequences, would fall directly 
within the expected topics of advice 
counsel would give a person charged with 
impaired driving. [para. 26]
The foreseeable  consequences of an impaired 
driving arrest, including a DRE demand and 
what might flow (an oral fluid or urine  sample 
demand), should have been expected by 
competent counsel such that they could have 
provided legal advice during the initial 
consultation. “There was ... a ‘linear 
progression’ from one to the other, a 
progression expressly contemplated by the 
Code,” said Justice Zarnett. “What occurred 
here, after the initial advice of counsel, was 
neither the result of changed circumstances 
or new developments. The procedures 
undertaken by the police were not, viewed in 
the context of an impaired dr iv ing 
investigation, non-routine such as to fall 
outside of what would be expected to be 
covered by the initial advice the [accused] 
received.”
2. Change in Jeopardy: Another opportunity to 
consult counsel must be provided if “the 
investigation takes a new and more serious 
turn” making the initial advice inadequate in 
light of “the actual situation, or jeopardy, the 
detainee faces”. This occurs because an initial 
consultation with counsel would be “tailored 
to the situation as the detainee and his lawyer 
then understand it” and based on what they 
were told as to the reasons for the detention. 
This category, however, did not apply either. 
Here, the investigation did not take “a new and 
more ser ious turn”  a f te r the in i t ia l 
consultation. There was no discrete change in 
the purpose of the investigation, no different 
and unrelated offence nor a  significantly more 
serious offence than that contemplated at the 
time of the s. 10(b) warning: 
The consequence s o f f o r e seeab l e 
investigative procedures in an impaired 
driving investigation — the prospect that 
compliance with either a DRE demand or 
oral fluid or urine sample demand may yield 
evidence that incriminates the accused and 
that non-compliance may be an offence — 
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is not a new jeopardy arising from a new 
and more serious turn of events. It is not a 
discrete change in the purpose of the 
impaired driving investigation to an offence 
not contemplated at the time the [accused] 
exercised his right to counsel. Just as the 
procedures themselves are foreseeable at 
the time of the initial consultation, the 
jeopardy arising from them is also 
foreseeable and within the expected subject 
matter of the initial consultation. [para. 35]
3. Lack of Understanding or Undermining of 
Counsel: If the circumstances indicate that the 
detainee did not understand his right to 
counsel, or if police undermined the legal 
advice received by the detainee by  “distorting 
or nullifying it”, another opportunity to 
consult counsel must be  provided. Here, the 
trial judge found the accused understood his 
right to counsel and there was no suggestion 
of the police  having undermined any advice. 
Nor were there any objective factors that 
“renewed legal consultation was required to 
permit [the accused] to make a meaningful 
choice  as to whether to cooperate with the 
police investigation or refuse to do so.” 
A New Category?
Although the categories in which a  right to re-
consult may arise are non-exhaustive, the Court of 
Appeal refused to recognize a new category in this 
case. There was not a change of circumstances that 
made a second consultation necessary to ensure 
that s. 10(b) has achieved its purpose:  
[N]either a DRE demand under what was then 
s. 254(3.1), nor an oral fluid or urine sample 
demand under what was then s. 254(3.4), is a 
change of circumstances from those facing a 
person detained on a charge of impaired 
driving. A person who has received legal advice 
(assumed to be sufficient and correct) after such 
a charge does not face a new or emergent 
situation when either demand is made. Because 
the demands are foreseeable and the initial 
advice would be expected to address them and 
their consequences, i t would not be 
appropriate to create a new category of cases in 
which there is an entitlement to a second 
consultation with counsel to cover the 
circumstances in the case at bar. [para. 39]
There was no breach of the accused’s s. 10(b) right 
to counsel and therefore it was unnecessary to 
consider whether a remedy was available under s. 
24 of the Charter. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
How the Accused Responded
The Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Tahmasebi is 
short on detail about how the accused responded to the 
police informing him of his right to counsel. However, 
the trial court ruling 2017 ONCJ 816 provides some 
insight.
When the officer arrested the accused, he was read his 
full rights to counsel. When asked if he understood, the 
accused said, “Yes, sir”.
When asked if he wanted to speak to a lawyer, the 
accused said, “Yes, please”.
After giving the accused the caution, the officer asked 
him to explain it back. The accused said, “Means if I say 
something, it can be used against me”.
The trial judge, in deciding that the accused did not have 
the right to re-consult counsel in this case, stated:
A second request to consult counsel, without more, is 
not sufficient to retrigger the s. 10(b) right. What is 
required is a change in circumstances that suggests 
that the choice faced by the detainee has been 
significantly altered, requiring further advice on the 
new situation, in order to fulfill the purpose of s. 
10(b). ... Existing jurisprudence has recognized that 
changed circumstances may result from: new 
procedures involving the detainee; a change in the 
jeopardy facing the detainee; or reason to believe 
that the detainee may not have understood the initial 
advice of the right to counsel.   The categories are 
not closed. [para. 65]
The judge went on to describe a lawyer who would not 
anticipate and include advice about the probable 
outcomes of the known statutory scheme arising from a 
charge of impaired driving, including testing, as 
exercising “professional negligence”.
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BC TO IMPLEMENT NEW AND 
REVISED PROFESSIONAL 
POLICING STANDARDS
On February 27, 2020 some 
new or rev i sed Br i t i sh 
Columbia Provincial Policing 
Standards will come into 
e f fec t . These s tandards 
require the chief constable, chief officer or 
commissioner to ensure their police force’s policies 
and procedures are consistent with the standards. 
New and reviewed standards include the following.
Neck Restraints - 1.5.1
Th i s new s t anda rd 
r e q u i r e s o f f i c e r s 
authorized to use the 
“ v a s c u l a r n e c k 
restraint” as a use of 
force technique to be 
trained and demonstrate 
proficiency in its use (1.5.1 (1)). A “vasular neck 
restraint” is defined as a “physical-control 
technique which applies compression of the 
vascular tissue along the lateral aspects of the 
neck, which results in temporary decreased 
cerebral blood flow, and may result in temporary 
loss of consciousness.”
Officers must also be requalified to apply the 
vascular neck  restraint in the fol lowing 
circumstances:
• If the police force permits the use of the 
vascular neck restraint in circumstances other 
than those where there  are reasonable 
grounds to believe that lethal force  is justified, 
each officer authorized to apply the vascular 
neck restraint must re-qualify every year, at a 
minimum, in applying this technique. 
(Standard 1.5.1 (2)(a))
• If the police force only permits the use of the 
vascular neck restraint in circumstances where 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
lethal force  is justified, each officer authorized 
to apply the vascular neck restraint must re- 
qualify every three years, at a minimum, in 
applying this technique. (Standard 1.5.1 (2)(b))
The Neck Restraint standard prohibits “the 
intentional use of chokeholds, unless the officer 
has reasonable grounds to believe that lethal force 
is justified” (1.5.1 (3)). A “chokehold” is defined as 
“a physical-control technique that applies pressure 
to the front of the neck and trachea/windpipe and 
restricts a person’s ability to breathe.”
Written records of the neck restraint training and 
re-qualifications must also be maintained. 
Emergency Vehicle Operations - 3.2.4
This new standard requires 
all police  officers to have 
successfully completed the 
BC Emergency Vehicle 
Operation (EVO) Training 
prior to operat ing an 
e m e r g e n c y v e h i c l e . 
Furthermore, every front-
line police officer and front-line supervisor must 
successfully complete an online course once every 
three years. 
Intermediate Weapons - 1.2.2
This revised standard now requires that “each 
intermediate weapon in the inventory of their 
police  force is maintained in good working 
order”  (1.2.2 (2.1)) and “each intermediate 
weapon is securely stored when not in use”  (1.2.2 
(2.2)). In addition, officers can only carry their 
issued intermediate weapons when on assigned 
duty  unless otherwise authorized in writing or by 
policy (1.2.2 (5.1).
An “intermediate weapon” is defined as “a device 
intended or designed to be used as a weapon, but 
for which the use is not intended or likely  to cause 
serious injury  or death. Impact weapons, aerosols 
and conducted energy weapons fall within this 
category. Intermediate weapons may also be 
referred to as less-lethal weapons.”
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Firearms and Ammunition - 1.1.1
This revised standard now requires officers to use 
only  approved holsters (1.1.1 (5.1)). Depending on 
the police entity, this approval must be made by the 
chief constable, chief officer, commissioner or their 
delegate. In addition, officers must be provided 
with training for each type of holster they are issued 
(1.1.1 (5.2)). 
Officers are also only allowed to carry their issued 
firearms when on assigned duty, unless otherwise 
authorized in writing or by policy  (1.1.1 (5.3)). This 
standard further requires that “each firearm and all 
ammunition is securely stored when not in 
use” (1.1.1 (6.2)).
 
Reporting and Investigation Following the 
Use of Force - 1.7.2
Standard 1.7.1, which was effective January 30, 
2012, will be repealed in its entirety and replaced 
with new standard 1.7.2. Some of the differences 
between standard 1.7.1 and 1.7.2 include:
Several new definitions have been added.
“Display” – the act of pointing, aiming or 
showing an intermediate  weapon or a firearm 
at or to a person without discharging it, for the 
purpose of generating compliance from a 
person. 
“Draw”  – the act of un-holstering or removing 
an intermediate weapon or a firearm from the 
holster without discharging it, as a preparatory 
step so that it is ready for use should it 
become necessary (i.e., not used to generate 
compliance). 
“Intermediate weapon discharge/application” 
– the act of firing or applying an intermediate 
weapon against a person. This includes 
situations where the discharge was intentional 
or not, and situations where the intermediate 
weapon is discharged but malfunctions or is 
unsuccessful in reaching the intended person.
 
“Physical control” – physical techniques used 
to control a person that do not involve the use 
of a weapon. 
“Physical control-hard” – physical techniques 
that are  intended to impede a  person’s 
behaviour or to allow application of a control 
technique; and have a higher probability  of 
causing injury. They may include empty hand 
strikes such as punches and kicks. 
“Physical control-soft” – soft techniques are 
control oriented and have a lower probability 
of causing injury. They may include restraining 
techniques, joint locks and non-resistant 
handcuffing. 
“Specialty munitions” – munitions that require 
specialized training and certification by 
officers and may include extended range 
impact munitions, impact rounds containing 
chemical agents, breaching munitions, Noise 
Flash Diversionary Devices, and munitions 
designed specifically for crowd dispersal. 
“Police  dog bite”  – a police dog’s use  of 
mouth and teeth to grab or hold a person’s 
body or clothes. 
“Use-of-force report” – the information that 
must be provided, in a provincially-approved 
format, when an officer applies force against a 
person. 
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“Vascular neck restraint” – physical control 
technique which applies compression of the 
vascular tissue along the lateral aspects of the 
neck, which results in temporary decreased 
cerebral blood flow, and may result in 
temporary loss of consciousness. 
“Weapon of opportunity” – an ordinary 
object that in its regular use is not intended as 
a weapon, but in a specific encounter is at 
hand for improvised use as a weapon (e.g., 
flashlight). 
Reportable use-of-force
This standard requires the reporting of use-of-force 
under the following circumstances (1.7.2 (1)):
• Use of physical control-soft, if an injury 
occurred to either the person or the officer 
from the application of that force;
• Use of physical control-hard; 
• Vascular neck restraint;
• Intermediate weapon display or discharge/
application; 
• Firearm display or discharge;
• Po l i c e d o g b i t e s ( i n t e n t i o n a l a n d 
unintentional); 
• Use of specialty munitions; and 
• Use of weapons of opportunity. 
These use-of-force reports must be:
• Recorded in a provincially-approved manner 
and format (1.7.2 (2)); 
• Completed within 48 hours of the incident 
unless there are  exceptional circumstances 
warranting an extension (1.7.2 (3)). An 
annotation to the standard states, “Timeline 
for completion of use of force reports –  In 
normal circumstances these are to be 
completed within 48 hours of the incident. In 
exceptional circumstances, such as an in-
custody death incident, a longer time period 
may be appropriate. Extensions are to be 
approved by the Chief Constable, Chief 
Officer, or Commissioner.”
• Linked to the relevant PRIME file (1.7.2 (4)); 
and
• Reviewed by a supervisor or use-of-force 
instructor fullness and compliance with policy 
(1.7.2 (5)).
If the force used was not compliant with policy, it 
must be reported to the chief constable, chief 
officer, commissioner or their delegate (1.7.2 (6)). 
Force resulting in injury or death
When the force used results in death or injury to 
any person is must be reported to B.C.’s Office  of 
the Police Complaint Commissioner (OPCC) as 
required by s. 89 of BC’s Police Act and to B.C.‘s 
Independent Investigations Office (IIO) under the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) respecting 
inves t iga t ions between the Independent 
Investigations Office and Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police  and Municipal Departments of BC and 
Transit Police and Stl’atl’imx Tribal Police (1.7.2 (7)). 
Reporting excessive use of force
The standard now places an affirmative duty on 
“any any officer who has reasonable grounds to 
believe that they have witnessed excessive use of 
force by another officer”  to report the incident to a 
supervisor or senior officer as soon as reasonably 
practicable (1.7.2 (5)). If the incident does not 
require reporting to the OPCC or the IIO, an 
investigation must be undertaken and a report 
submitted to the chief constable, chief officer, 
commissioner or their delegate (1.7.2 (11)). 
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Use-of-Force Models - 1.9.1
This revised standard now requires a police force to 
use one of two approved use-of-force models:
1. National Use  of Force Framework (NUFF) & 
Crisis-Intervention & De-escalation (CID) 
model to be used by a police force.
2. Incident Management and Intervention Model 
(IMIM) & Crisis-Intervention & De-escalation 
(CID).
CEW Testing - 1.3.5
The protocols for testing a CEW described in the 
Test Procedure  for Conducted Energy Weapons 
Version 2.0 and attached as Appendix “A” to the 
revised standard have been updated to include:
• The addition of the Taser X2 and X26P;
• Altered sampling rates and triggering settings;
• The requirement for gap for X2 testing;
• The addition of a bibliography; and
• A clarified definition of net charge for different 
units. 
More on the Provincial Policing Standards here.
CANADA’s TOP 10 STOLEN 
VEHICLES IN 2019
A c c o r d i n g t o t h e 
In su rance Bureau o f 
Canada, the 2007 Ford 
F350 was the vehicle most 
often stolen in Canada in 
2019. Their annual list of Top 10 Stolen Vehicles is 
based on actual insurance claims data collected 
from nearly all automobile insurance companies in 
Canada. 
Source: Insurance Bureau of Canada, “Top 10 Stolen Vehicles”, accessed on 
February 15, 2019. 
Canada’s Top 10 Stolen Vehicles - 2019
Rank Vehicle
1 2007 FORD F350 SD 4WD
2 2006 FORD F350 SD 4WD
3 2005 FORD F350 SD 4WD
4 2004 FORD F350 SD 4WD
5 2006 FORD F250 SD 4WD




8 2005 FORD F250 SD 4WD
9 2002 FORD F350 SD 4WD
10 1998 HONDA CIVIC SI 2DR COUPE
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OCCUPANT DETAINED WHEN 
ISOLATED & QUESTIONED 
DURING SEARCH WARRANT
R. v. McSweeney, 2020 ONCA 2
After receiving a report that child 
pornography images had been 
uploaded to a social networking site, 
police investigated further and 
de te rmined tha t the up loads 
originated from an internet account registered to a 
specific address. The accused’s wife was the 
subscriber, and the home was occupied by the 
accused and his family. The  police prepared a 
search warrant for the home to seize electronic 
storage devices, computers, and other devices 
capable of accessing the internet. The warrant was 
executed at approximately 6:03 a.m. when nine 
police officers entered the house, some in uniform 
while others wore vests identifying them as police.
Police knocked on the door and the accused’s wife 
allowed the officers entry. The accused, who was 
upstairs in the shower, came downstairs shortly 
after police arrived. A detective showed the 
accused the warrant and allowed him read it. The 
detective  then asked the accused whether he knew 
why police were at his house. The accused denied 
knowing anything about child pornography. While 
the accused continued to read the warrant, the 
detective asked him whether he could direct him to 
a computer in the  house that might have child 
pornography on it. The accused replied, “I’m not 
saying anything until I get my thoughts together.”
The family was gathered in the living room so 
police could secure the scene and ensure that 
electronic equipment was no longer transmitting, 
and to make areas containing electronics “off-
limits”. The detective explained to the family what 
would be taking place during the search. They were 
told that they were not permitted to use their 
electronic devices, including cellphones. A police 
officer was stationed in the living room while  this 
discussion took place and she remained there with 
the family throughout the search. The accused’s 
wife was allowed to go to the kitchen to use the 
land line for making a call. 
At about 6:29 a.m., the accused’s wife, who was 
not a suspect, was asked to come to the  front porch 
of the home to give an audio statement and she 
agreed to do so. The accused remained in the living 
room while his wife was questioned for about 20 
minutes. At about 6:53 a.m., the accused, who was 
considered a suspect, was asked to come to the 
porch to give a recorded statement. He had not 
been cautioned or informed of his right to counsel. 
In his statement, the accused told police he should 
be the only one questioned. After the interview, the 
accused was arrested, cautioned, informed of his 
right to a lawyer, and taken to the police station 
where  he spoke to duty counsel. The detective then 
took a second statement from the accused. 
Throughout most of the interview, the accused 
maintained that he wished to remain silent but 
when asked whether there was “any chance that 
anybody else in the house is involved”, he replied, 
“[a]bsolutely not.”
Ontario Court of Justice
In giving his evidence, the detective 
admitted he should have cautioned the 
accused and informed him of his right to 
counsel before  questioning him at the 
home. He said it was a mistake not to do so 
because  the accused was considered to be a 
suspect. The judge, however, concluded the 
accused had not been detained during the search of 
his home. 
The judge found there was no evidence the 
accused had been physically detained nor 
psychologically detained. “Not only was [the 
accused] free to come and go during the search, 
he was present when his wife asked to use the 
landline  telephone and get the children ready for 
school and these requests were granted,”  said the 
judge. “In reaching the conclusion that [the 
accused] was not detained I have rejected the 
submission that because an officer remained in the 
living room with the family, [the accused] felt he 
was under police guard and not free to leave. 
There  was no evidence to support this submission. 
Also, [the accused] never asked to leave the living 
room even though he saw his wife and children 
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leave and go about their daily  business.” Since 
there  was no detention, the officer was not legally 
required to inform the accused of his right to 
counsel under s. 10(b).
As for the absence of a caution, it was only one of 
the factors to be considered in determining whether 
the accused’s statement was voluntary. Moreover, 
the judge noted the accused appeared to be well-
aware of his right to remain silent. Since there was 
no detention, the accused’s s. 10(b) rights were not 
engaged. The police had not improperly elicited a 
confession on the porch; it was voluntary. This 
statement was admissible and did not taint the 
second statement which was also admissible. In 
any event, the two statements were not connected 
to each other since the second statement was made 
after a fresh start. The accused was convicted of 
possessing child pornography and distributing it. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued, in part, 
that he was detained at the time 
of his first statement and 
therefore his s. 10 (b) right to 
counsel without delay was triggered. He also 
submitted that his second statement at the police 
station was obtained in a manner that breached s. 
10(b) and therefore both statements ought to have 
been excluded under s. 24(2).  
s. 10(b) Charter
The s. 10(b) right to counsel is engaged only on 
arrest or detention. Chief Justice Strathy, writing the 
Court of Appeal’s decision, outlined the  meaning of 
s. 10(b). He stated: 
The s. 10(b) right attaches immediately on 
detention, subject to concerns for officer safety. 
It creates the right to retain and instruct counsel 
without delay and the right to be informed of 
that right, in order to effectively exercise it. A 
detained person who chooses to exercise their 
right must be given a reasonable opportunity to 
do so, and police must refrain from eliciting 
incriminating evidence from the detained 
person until he or she has had a reasonable 
opportunity to consult with counsel. 
[...]
An individual’s s. 10(b) right is thus intimately 
connected to their control over their own 
person. While an individual confronted by the 
authority of the state ordinarily has the option 
to simply walk away, this choice can be 
removed by physical or psychological 
compulsion, resulting in detention. Once 
detained, however, “the individual’s choice 
whether to speak to the authorities remains, 
and is protected by the s. 10 informational 
requirements and the s. 7 right to silence”. 
[references omitted, paras. 28-30]
In determining whether an individual’s right to 
counsel has been triggered, a court must first 
determine whether a detention has occurred. Chief 
Justice Strathy stated:
Detention can by physical or psychological. 
Psychological detention occurs where a person 
has a legal obligation to comply with a police 
direction, or where “the police conduct would 
cause a reasonable person to conclude that he 
or she was not free to go and had to comply 
with the police direction or demand”. In 
determining whether someone has been 
psychologically detained, the inquiry is an 
objective one, having regard to how a 
reasonable person would perceive the state 
conduct in the circumstances. An objective 
“The s. 10(b) right attaches immediately on detention, subject to concerns for 
officer safety. It creates the right to retain and instruct counsel without delay 
and the right to be informed of that right, in order to effectively exercise it. A 
detained person who chooses to exercise their right must be given a reasonable 
opportunity to do so, and police must refrain from eliciting incriminating 
evidence from the detained person until he or she has had a reasonable 
opportunity to consult with counsel.”
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inquiry recognizes the need for police 
themselves to appreciate when detention 
occurs, so they can fulfill their Charter 
obligations to detained persons. [references 
omitted, para. 33]
Detention When Executing a Search 
Warrant in a Home
This case involved a police/citizen encounter 
through the exercise of police authority  during the 
lawful execution of a search warrant. “There is no 
question that during the execution of a search 
warrant police are entitled to segregate the 
occupants of the premises to ensure officer safety, 
to prevent the loss or destruction of evidence, and 
to maintain the integrity of the search,”  said Chief 
Justice Strathy. “They may give appropriate 
directions to that end.” However, the police are 
limited in what they can do. He went on to adopt a 
statement from R. v Owen, 2017 ONCJ 731, where 
it was written:
[O]nce the police have “cleared” the house 
and ensured that they have accounted for all 
the occupants, they must have a basis for any 
continued detention of any occupant(s). They 
are not permitted to simply keep the occupants 
in a room, incommunicado, while they go 
about their search of the house. Once police 
have ensured their safety, they are not justified 
in holding the occupants in a room unless the 
occupants are being arrested or otherwise 
be[ing] lawfully detained. Provided the 
occupants are not interfering with the search, 
they are permitted to stay in and move about 
the residence; or, they may leave.
In some cases, “where police have acted solely to 
ensure the integrity of the search, where the 
interference with liberty was modest, and where 
any questioning was not focused on the person’s 
involvement in a crime, courts have found no 
detention.”
Was there a Detention?
The Court of Appeal found the trial judge had erred 
by failing to apply the objective test in determining 
“whether a reasonable person in the [accused’s] 
circumstances would conclude by reason of the 
state conduct that he or she had no choice but to 
comply.” Rather, “she treated the exercise largely 
as a subjective inquiry, asking whether there was 
evidence of the [accused’s] state of mind.” 
In this case, the Court of Appeal found the accused 
was psychologically  detained, at the very latest, 
when he was asked to come to the porch to give a 
statement. The encounter had lasted about 50 
minutes up until that point. Focused and accusatory 
statements were made to the accused, and he had 
been sequestered under guard and then asked to 
come to another area of the home to make a 
recorded statement. A reasonable person in the 
accused’s situation would have concluded that they 
were obliged to comply:
• Circumstances giving rise to the encounter. 
➡ The police were not acting solely to ensure 
the integrity of the search, but were engaged 
in a focused investigation. 
➡ The accused was singled out for focused 
investigation. 
➡ Accusatory questions were posed that invited 
self-incrimination. Asking “Do you know 
why we are here?” and “can you tell us the 
location of computers in this house with 
child pornography on them?” would cause a 
reasonable person in the accused’s position 
to conclude that they were a suspect, 
perhaps the prime suspect, in a police 
investigation into child pornography in their 
own home. 
➡ The police were not merely executing the 
search warrant, they were  targeting and 
questioning a suspect.
“There is no question that during the execution of a search warrant police are 
entitled to segregate the occupants of the premises to ensure officer safety, to 
prevent the loss or destruction of evidence, and to maintain the integrity of the 
search. They may give appropriate directions to that end.”
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➡ The family was segregated in one area  of the 
home, without the use of phones and 
electronic devices. “While the police were 
justified in clearing the house to ensure the 
integrity of the search, the prolonged 
sequestering of the family in the living room 
was unnecessary for that purpose,” said the 
Appeal Court. “There was no suggestion that 
they attempted to interfere with the search 
or were anything other than co-operative. 
The fact that the [accused’s] wife  found it 
necessary to ask for permission to use the 
land line in the  kitchen, speaks to a 
perception that she was not free to do so 
without permission. The same is true of her 
request to allow her children to get ready 
for school.”
➡ While his wife was being interviewed outside 
on the porch, the accused was left sitting in 
the living room with his children and a 
police officer continued to stand guard over 
them. 
➡ The accused was asked to come out on the 
porch to speak to the detective and give a 
recorded statement. 
• The nature of the police conduct.
➡ Although there was no physical contact, the 
detective used language that was targeted 
and accusatory.
➡ The warrant was executed by nine police 
officers at 6:03 a.m., a  time when most 
people are just waking up and when working 
people with children are getting ready for 
their busy day. “This would cause a 
reasonable person to feel the weight of the 
state in their home, the most private of 
places.”
➡ The encounter lasted about 40 minutes 
before the accused was invited to give a 
statement on the porch. 
• The particular characteristics of the individual.
➡ The accused was a  mature, educated, and 
articulate adult with some appreciation of his 
rights in the face of the officer’s inquiries.
Admissibility
Not only was the accused’s first statement obtained 
as a result of a s. 10(b) breach, his second 
statement was also so obtained even though he had 
spoken to counsel and had been cautioned prior to 
it being taken. Chief Justice Strathy concluded that 
the second statement was temporally, contextually 
and causally connected to the first statement, 
which had been obtained as a  result of a Charter 
breach:
The statements were relatively close in time to 
each other. About four hours elapsed between 
the end of the first statement in the [accused’s] 
home and the beginning of the second 
statement at the police station. In the 
meantime, the [accused] went through what 
must have been a head-spinning and stressful 
process of arrest, transportation to the police 
station, parading and processing at the station, 
waiting, and consulting with duty counsel. In 
the context of this case, the passage of time was 
not sufficient to sever the link between the two 
statements.
The statements were also linked contextually. 
At the end of the first statement, [the detective] 
told the [accused] that the questioning would 
continue at the station: “[W]hen I come back to 
the station, I’d like to sit down and chat with 
you, but that, talk to your lawyer first, ok?” 
While the [accused] did speak to counsel, [the 
detective] was the only person present at the 
second interview. The officer’s presence served 
to connect the two statements. [paras. 61-62]
This connection was also confirmed when, at the 
beginning of the recorded statement at the  second 
interview, the  detective said the second statement 
was a continuation of the earlier statement which 
was cut short because the accused wished to talk to 
duty  counsel. In addition, the officer continued to 
employ the same investigative techniques used in 
the first interview such as gaining the accused’s 
trust by being considerate of his well-being and 
using the implicit threat that if the accused was not 
forthright, he would have to interview his children. 
“In my view, informing the [accused] of his rights 
and providing access to duty counsel did not serve 
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to remove the taint of the initial Charter 
infringement or to sever the nexus between the 
two statements,” said Chief Justice Strathy. “The 
presence of the officer who was responsible for 
that breach, and who had taken the first statement 
a few hours earlier, the reference to the earlier 
statement and the use of the same interview 
techniques created a situation in which both 
interviews can reasonably be described as ‘all part 
of the same interrogation process’.”
After balancing the factors to consider under s. 
24(2), both statements were excluded from 
evidence: 
The state conduct was willful and in disregard 
of the [accused’s] asserted Charter rights. It had 
a serious impact on those rights and on his 
attempt to exercise them. While society has a 
strong interest in the adjudication of the 
charges on their merits, the exclusion of the 
evidence will not preclude the Crown from 
proceeding with the charges, if it chooses to do 
so, relying on forensic evidence obtained from 
the computers themselves. This is not a case in 
which the Crown’s case will be gutted by the 
exclusion of the improperly-obtained evidence. 
It may be more challenging to prove, but it has 
not been suggested that it would be impossible. 
[para. 83]
The accused’s appeal was allowed, his convictions 
were quashed and a new trial was ordered. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
NO ARREST, DETENTION or  
REASONABLE GROUNDS: 
s. 146(2) YCJA INAPPLICABLE
R. v. Joseph, 2020 ONCA 73
Police received a 911 call at 9:18 pm 
reporting a stabbing. The deceased 
had been stabbed 17 times in total. 
The next day, by 3:48 am, the police 
had obtained the deceased’s phone 
records and identified the phone numbers that he 
had been in contact with in the two hours before 
he was killed. Among others, the deceased’s phone 
had been in contact with a  phone that was 
registered to the accused’s mother. These phones 
had exchanged 29 text messages and connected on 
four calls in the time leading up to when the 
deceased was killed. But the police did not know 
the content of those text messages.
The police attended at the accused’s mother’s home 
the next day, still well less than 48 hours since the 
homicide. They spoke with the accused’s mother, 
told her that they were investigating a homicide, 
and inquired about the phone. The accused’s 
mother confirmed that the phone number was 
registered to her but that her son,  the  accused, was 
not at home. He was 17-years old. The police left a 
business card and asked the mother to have her son 
contact them. The police then proceeded to another 
address that corresponded to a different number 
with which the deceased’s phone had been in 
contact on the day of the homicide.
Shortly after they had left the accused’s home, the 
officers got a call from the accused. They asked him 
to come into the police station to speak with them 
and he agreed to do so. Not long after that 
discussion, the accused arrived at the  police station 
with his mother. An officer met the accused and his 
mother at the station and told him that they were 
investigating a homicide and that they would like 
to speak with him about any information he may 
have. He agreed to do so and his mother was 
present. He was never given a full s. 10(b) caution 
but was simply told, “you also have … your right if 
you want, you can call a lawyer … or you can call 
a lawyer for any question you may have regarding 
this or anything down the road”.  
Similarly, he was never given a full caution 
concerning  the right to remain silent.  He was 
simply  told by an officer, “I can’t force you to say 
anything, only you know if you do have 
information that would be  great to help us”.  
During a 26-minute interview, the  police made 
numerous inquiries about the deceased, including 
about whether the accused knew him, what he 
knew about him, their relationship and when they 
last had contact. While the accused admitted that 
he had communicated with the deceased on the 
day of the stabbing, his interview was exculpatory. 
He admitted to having about four phone calls with 
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the deceased but vastly  understated the number of 
text messages they had shared and the timing of 
those messages. The accused was ultimately 
charged with first degree murder. 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused sought the exclusion of his 
statement because, in his view, the 
police failed to comply with s. 146(2) of 
the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) and 
his statement was involuntary. He submitted that 
the police had reasonable grounds to believe he 
committed an offence and that he was detained 
when questioned. Thus, he contended s. 146(2) was 
triggered. 
The judge ruled that the police did not have 
reasonable grounds for believing that the accused 
had committed an offence. He held that the 
“reasonable grounds for believing” threshold was 
the same as that found in s. 495(1)(a) of the 
Criminal Code  and was something more than 
“reasonable suspicion” or “possible guilt”.  At the 
time the interview took place, the only information 
connecting the accused to the deceased were 
phone records which revealed a good deal of 
contact between the two on the day of the 
homicide. This, however, did not give rise to 
reasonable grounds to believe that the accused was 
involved in the killing. It didn’t even amount to a 
reasonable suspicion that the accused was the 
perpetrator of the offence. Nor was the accused 
psychologically detained at any point during the 
interview. He called the police of his own free will; 
attended at the police station of his own free will 
and left after the interview of his own free will; his 
mother was in attendance the whole time; the 
police questioning  was entirely exploratory  and of 
a general nature; and, when he inquired, the 
accused was specifically told he did not have to 
answer specific questions and decided not to 
answer one of them. 
The judge also concluded that the accused’s 
s tatement was voluntary. There were no 
inducements that would have overborne his will. 
Nor was there anything in the  interview to suggest 
an atmosphere of oppression, a lack of an operating 
mind, or any trickery involved in the taking of the 
statement. The mere fact that the  accused was not 
given a full caution about the right to counsel or 
the right to remain silent did not matter because the 
police were under no obligation to afford those 
cautions; the accused had not been detained or 
arrested. The accused’s statement to police was 
admitted and he was convicted of second degree 
murder by a jury based on all of the evidence 
presented. He was sentenced as an adult and given 
a life  sentence with parole  eligibility after seven 
years.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued, among 
other things, that the trial judge 
erred in admitting the statement 
he gave to police. He submitted 
that the police failed to comply with s. 146(2) of 
the YCJA -  a  provision governing the admissibility 
of statements from young persons - and in 
concluding his statement was voluntary. He 
suggested that, as a “suspect”, the police were 
obligated to caution him about his right to silence 
and the right to counsel. Further, he asserted that 
the police induced him to provide a statement.
s. 146(2) of the YJCA
Justice Fairbairn, authoring the Court of Appeal’s 
decision, concluded that because the accused was 
17-years old at the time he gave his statement he 
was a “young person” under the YCJA. The YCJA 
has provisions that supplement the common law 
relating to the admissibility of statements of young 
persons:
In defined circumstances, s. 146(2) provides 
numerous additional protections, beyond those 
provided at common law, to young persons 
giving written or oral statements to persons in 
authority. The provision responds to and cares 
for the accepted vulnerabilities of young 
persons. ...
Section 146(2) makes a young person’s 
statement presumptively inadmissible unless 
the Crown dislodges that presumption. To this 
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end, the provision has been described as an 
admissibility rule that is “exclusionary by 
nature, but inclusionary by exception”. It 
places the onus on the Crown to demonstrate 
beyond a reasonable doubt one of two things: 
(a) why the provision does not apply; or, (b) if 
the provision applies, that its statutory 
requirements were met.
There are three statutory prerequisites to the 
operation of s. 146(2): (a) the youth is arrested; 
(b) the youth is detained; or (c) the “peace 
officer or other person has reasonable grounds 
for believing that the young person has 
committed an offence”. [references omitted, 
paras. 20-22]
In this case, the Court of Appeal agreed with the 
trial judge that none of the  statutory prerequisites 
upon which to trigger the operation of s. 146(2) 
existed. Therefore, the  police were not statutorily 
obliged to meet the s. 146(2) criteria:
• No Arrest: The accused was not under arrest 
at the  time that he gave his statement to the 
police. 
• No Reasonable Grounds for Believing 
the Accused Committed an Offence. 
“‘[R]easonable grounds for believing that the 
young person has committed an offence’ in s. 
146(2) is synonymous with the threshold test 
for arrest without warrant,” said Justice 
Fairbairn. “The s. 495(1)(a) threshold test for 
arrest without warrant is time worn and well 
understood. The officer must have a subjective 
belief that the individual committed (or is 
about to commit) an indictable offence and 
that belief must be objectively reasonable in the 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s . I n o t h e r wo r d s , t h e 
circumstances known to the police at the time 
of the arrest must be capable  of permitting a 
reasonable person, ‘standing in the shoes of the 
police  officer’, to believe that grounds for 
arrest exist.” She continued:
The police did not subjectively believe that 
they had grounds to arrest the [accused] either 
when he arrived for or left the interview. The 
evidence about the officers’ subjective states 
BY THE BOOK:
s. 146(2) Youth Criminal Justice Act
When statements are admissible
s. 146 (2) No oral or written statement made 
by a young person who is less than eighteen 
years old, to a peace officer or to any other 
person who is, in law, a person in authority, 
on the arrest or detention of the young person 
or in circumstances where the peace officer or other person 
has reasonable grounds for believing that the young person 
has committed an offence is admissible against the young 
person unless
(a) the statement was voluntary;
(b) the person to whom the statement was made has, 
before the statement was made, clearly explained to 
the young person, in language appropriate to his or her 
age and understanding, that
(i) the young person is under no obligation to make a 
statement,
(ii) any statement made by the young person may be 
used as evidence in proceedings against him or 
her,
(iii) the young person has the right to consult counsel 
and a parent or other person in accordance with 
paragraph (c), and
(iv) any statement made by the young person is 
required to be made in the presence of counsel 
and any other person consulted in accordance with 
paragraph (c), if any, unless the young person 
desires otherwise;
(c) the young person has, before the statement was made, 
been given a reasonable opportunity to consult
(i) with counsel, and
(ii) with a parent or, in the absence of a parent, an 
adult relative or, in the absence of a parent and 
an adult relative, any other appropriate adult 
chosen by the young person, as long as that person 
is not a co-accused, or under investigation, in 
respect of the same offence; and
(d) if the young person consults a person in accordance 
with paragraph (c), the young person has been given a 
reasonable opportunity to make the statement in the 
presence of that person.
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of mind, though, did not drive the result in 
this case. Rather, the trial judge correctly 
focused on the facts that would have 
objectively supported a belief that the 
[accused] was arrestable at the time of the 
interview. Necessarily, those facts needed to 
be known by the police at the time that the 
interview took place and not at some later 
point in time.
The trial judge’s analysis was almost entirely 
informed by the objective reality of the 
situation as known by the officers less than 48 
hours after the deceased had been killed. 
While the case against the [accused] 
undoubtedly strengthened over t ime, 
including the discovery of the [accused’s] and 
deceased’s DNA on a hat found close to the 
scene of the murder, the DNA results were not 
known at the time of the interview. I agree 
with the trial judge that at that time, there 
were simply insufficient grounds to believe 
that the [accused] had “committed an 
offence” within the meaning of s. 146(2) of 
the YCJA.
To use police parlance, while the phone 
contact made the [accused] a “person of 
interest” to them, it did not make him 
arrestable. There could have been any number 
of reasons why the [accused] had contact with 
the deceased on the day of the homicide, 
many of which would not point toward him 
being a party to the homicide. While there 
was much to trigger a police desire to speak 
with the [accused] (and, for that matter, the 
other individual who had clearly been in 
contact with the deceased’s phone on the day 
of the homicide), the phone contact alone did 
not furnish grounds to believe the [accused] 
was culpable in the homicide. Phone contact 
– the content of which is unknown – with a 
person who is killed shortly after will 
undoubtedly attract police attention. Standing 
on its own, though, that contact does not give 
r ise to a reasonable belief that the 
communicator killed the other person. [paras. 
30-32]
There were no reasonable grounds for believing 
that the accused had killed the deceased. 
Section 146(2) of the YCJA was not triggered on 
this basis.
• No Detention: The accused was not 
psychologically detained at the time of the 
interview. The Court of Appeal rejected the 
accused’s submission that there was a more 
robust test for psychological detention under s. 
146(2) of the YCJA than s. 9 of the Charter 
because  of the unique vulnerabilities of young 
people. “There is no special test to be applied 
when determining whether a young person is 
detained under the YCJA,”  said Justice Fairbairn. 
“[The test for psychological detention] requires 
that the individual circumstances of the alleged 
detainee, including the age of the detainee, be 
taken into account in assessing whether she or 
he was detained.” And further:
This test for psychological detention already 
accounts for the alleged detainee’s specific 
individual circumstances, including her or 
his age. The test allows for the [accused’s] 
youth to be taken into account when 
determining whether the youth perceived 
that he or she had no choice but to 
comply. ... That test for detention is directly 
transferrable to the s. 146(2) YCJA context. 
“‘[R]easonable grounds for believing that the young person has committed an 
offence’ in s. 146(2) is synonymous with the threshold test for arrest without 
warrant. The s. 495(1)(a) threshold test for arrest without warrant is time worn 
and well understood.”
“There is no special test to be applied when determining whether a young person 
is detained under the YCJA. ... [The test for psychological detention] requires that 
the individual circumstances of the alleged detainee, including the age of the 
detainee, be taken into account in assessing whether she or he was detained.”
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Approaching the test for detention 
differently in the s. 146(2) YCJA context 
would create unnecessary confusion in the 
law and inject uncertainty into on-the-
ground policing. I see no reason why the 
Grant test for detention, one that specifically 
accounts for the age of the alleged detainee, 
is not equally appropriate in the YCJA 
context. Nothing more is required. 
[references omitted, paras. 39-40]
In addition to the factors identified by the  trial 
judge in determining that there was no 
detention, the Appeal Court added the 
following:
... While the [accused] was young, he was 
almost eighteen years of age. ... [T]here was 
nothing inherently intimidating about the 
interview process. Indeed, at one point the 
[accused] took charge of the interview and 
told the officers to “skip” a certain line of 
questioning that he did not wish to answer. 
The interview was not adversarial in nature. 
While the interview room door was closed, 
there is no suggestion it was locked. The 
video recording that the trial judge viewed 
demonstrates a polite environment, where 
the police clearly informed the [accused] 
that he did not have to answer any 
questions if he did not wish to do so. 
Although unnecessary, the [accused] was 
repeatedly told he could speak with a 
lawyer if he wished to do so, but he chose 
not to do so.
None of this suggests the conduct of a 
person who believed he had no choice but 
to comply. [para. 42-43]
Voluntariness
Justice Fairbairn ruled that there is no requirement 
to caution a suspect who is not detained or 
arrested. “I disagree with the proposition that the 
police  are obliged to caution a suspect, simply 
because he or she is a suspect, and that the failure 
to do so will render a statement involuntary,”  she 
said. “Section 10(b) of the [Charter] requires that 
an accused be informed of the right to counsel at 
the time of arrest or detention. Moreover, the 
residual constitutional protection afforded to the 
right to silence under s. 7 of the Charter also only 
arises after detention, when the superior power of 
the state is imposed upon the individual.” She 
continued:
 ...  [The accused] was neither detained nor 
arrested at the time of the interview. 
Accordingly, even if he was a suspect at the 
time of the interview, a characterization that 
the trial judge specifically rejected, the police 
were under no constitutional obligation to 
caution him.
The [accused] says, though, that even if the 
caution were not constitutionally required, the 
failure to caution him rendered his statement 
involuntary under the common law confessions 
rule because he did not know that he could 
refuse to speak with the police.
I reject the proposition that involuntariness 
flows directly from the absence of a caution, 
even where the interviewee is a youth. [para. 
51-53]
And further:
... [W]hile a caution may assist someone with 
deciding whether to speak with the police, and 
therefore may inform a voluntariness analysis, 
the absence of a caution is only a factor to 
consider in determining the voluntariness of a 
statement. It is not a prerequisite to the 
voluntariness of that statement.
As the [accused] was neither detained, nor 
arrested, I agree with the trial judge that his 
statement was not rendered involuntary 
through the lack of a caution. [references 
omitted, paras. 55-56]
“[W]hile a caution may assist someone with deciding whether to speak with the 
police, and therefore may inform a voluntariness analysis, the absence of a 
caution is only a factor to consider in determining the voluntariness of a 
statement. It is not a prerequisite to the voluntariness of that statement.”
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Despite there being no s. 10(b) compliant caution, 
the accused had been told that he could speak with 
a lawyer if he wished to do so and that he did not 
have to answer questions if he did not wish to do 
so. Moreover, Justice Fairbairn agreed there were 
no improper inducements. Suggesting that the 
accused could be a  witness depending on what he 
said, advising him it was his one opportunity to tell 
the truth, and telling him that the purpose of the 
recording was for police “records only” did not 
cross the line:
The first impugned statement – that depending 
on what he said, the [accused] could be a 
witness – relates to an inquiry that was initiated 
by the [accused], not the police. In any event, it 
was an honest answer to the [accused’s] 
question about whether he was a witness. At 
that stage, the police did not know whether he 
was a witness to something or not. As the 
officer said, it would depend on what he told 
the police. The second impugned statement – 
that it was the [accused’s] one chance to tell 
the truth – could have been phrased better, but 
was made in the context of the officer 
informing the [accused] that it is an offence to 
lie to the police.
Even if these police statements could be viewed 
as inducements, they were not improper in 
nature. There is nothing wrong with offering an 
interviewee an inducement to speak. The 
voluntariness of a statement is not thrown into 
doubt s imply because an accused is 
encouraged to speak, including through 
inducements. The question is whether such 
inducements cause the interviewee’s will to be 
overborne. I t is the “strength of the 
inducement”, the threat or promise – informed 
by all of the circumstances, that informs 
whether the will of the accused is overborne.
As reviewed previously, the interaction 
between the police and the [accused] in this 
case demonstrates that the [accused’s] will was 
never overborne. Even if the impugned police 
comments could be construed as inducements 
as the [accused] suggests, he was in full control 
throughout the interview. This was clearly 
displayed at one point in the interview when 
the [accused] queried whether he had to 
answer a particular question. He had already 
been told that he could not be forced to say 
anything. The police reinforced this fact, 
assuring the [accused] that he did not have to 
answer anything he did not wish to answer. The 
[accused] then told the police to “skip” that 
question. As noted by the trial judge, this is not 
the behaviour of someone whose will has been 
overcome. 
Finally, the [accused] argues that the police 
misled the [accused] about the purpose of the 
recording because he was told that the 
videotape would be for police “records only”. 
That comment must be set in its proper context. 
It only came up when the [accused’s] mother 
expressed concern that the video would make 
its way onto television and she did not want her 
“face to go on T.V.”. It was in response to that 
expression of concern by the mother that the 
officer said that the videotape was for police 
records only. She was also told that this was the 
way that the “Toronto Police do their 
interviews” and that they wished to have a 
“true version of a statement” so that there are 
no “questions down the road.”
I do not agree that the police misled the 
[accused] about the purposes to which the 
recording could be put. The [accused] was told 
shortly afterwards that he may be a witness in 
this matter, although it would all depend on 
what he had to say. Accordingly, at a minimum, 
he knew that the statement could be relevant to 
a criminal proceeding and that it was being 
recorded for accuracy so that there was no 
question as to what he said down the road.
Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of this 
impugned statement as an inducement to 
speak. Like the above impugned passages, 
there was no quid pro quo, let alone an 
overcoming of the [accused’s] will. There is no 
suggestion that the comment constitutes a 
police trick that would undermine the integrity 
of the criminal justice system. [references 
omitted, paras. 61-66]
The statement accused’s statement was voluntary 
and his appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s Note: Additional details obtained from R. 
v. P.J., 2015 ONSC 6057.
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2020 British Columbia 
Law Enforcement Memorial 
 
In 1998 the Government of Canada proclaimed the last Sunday in September as Police & Peace Officers’ 
National Memorial Day. On this day every year Canadians are given an opportunity to formally express 
appreciation for the dedication of Law Enforcement Officers who make the ultimate, tragic sacrifice to 
keep communities safe. 
 
Sunday, September 27, 2020 at 1:00 pm 
Ceremony at the BC Legislature in Victoria, BC 
 
Law Enforcement participants to form up in the 800 block of Government Street at 12:00 pm. 
 
For complete events information including annual Memorial Golf Tournament, Ride to Remember 
and Run to Remember visit our website at http://www.bclem.ca 
or   
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UPCOMING ONLINE COURSES  
April 1 - 29, 2020
Internet Open Source Investigations (INVE-1022)
April 8 - May 13, 2020
Introduction to Administrative Law (INVE-1002)
UPCOMING COURSES IN NEW 
WESTMINSTER  
April 16 - 17, 2020
Introduction to the Criminal Justice System 
(INVE-1000)
April 20 - 22, 2020
Investigative File Case Management (INVE-1010)
April 25, 2020
Personal Safety (INVE-1300)
April 29 - May 1, 2020
Introduction to Criminal Law (INVE-1001)
May 2 -16, 2020
Introduction to Investigative Skills and Processes 
(INVE-1003)
May 4 - 6, 2020
Introduction to Criminal Law (INVE-1001)
UPCOMING COURSES IN VICTORIA
April 27 - 28, 2020
Introduction to the Criminal Justice System 
(INVE-1000) 
May 5 - 7, 2020
Introduction to Administrative Law (INVE-1002) 
May 27 - 29, 2020
Introduction to Criminal Law (INVE-1001) 
Apply for the Investigation & 
Enforcement Skills Certificate
Complete the Investigation & Enforcement Skills Certificate, 
an academic credential that can help you pursue or 
advance your in the field of investigation, enforcement and 
public safety. Many people who have completed the 
requirements for the certificate have gone on to a variety of 
rewarding careers. Apply online today. For more 
information, visit the Investigation & Enforcement Skills 
Certificate 
webpage.
Upcoming Investigation & Enforcement Skills Courses
View the full 2020 Course Calendar online.
Volume 14 Issue 6 - November/December 2014
15-006
BACHELOR OF LAW ENFORCEMENT STUDIES
BACHELOR OF PUBLIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
Expand your academic credentials and enhance your career options.  
Gain the theoretical background, applied skills and specialized 
knowledge for a career in public safety.
keeping communities safe
enforcing the law
on the front line
Apply today. JIBC.ca 604.528.5590    register@jibc.ca  
715 McBride Boulevard, New Westminster, BC
Be the one
